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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TARIFF COMMISSION
ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
Stanley D. Metzger and Alfred G. Musreyff
There has been a great deal of confusion concerning the judicial
review of Tariff Commission actions and proceedings performed by
the United States Customs Court2 and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA).s The procedures under which these
courts have assumed jurisdiction, the scope of their judicial review,
the manner in which they have construed the substantive provisions
involved in the litigation before them, the recent change in the status
of these courts from "legislative" to "constitutional" courts, and the
virtual absence of review by the United States Supreme Court all have
conspired to create complexities and uncertainties in an area of foreign
trade regulation that is subject to virtually no constitutional limitations. It is the purpose of this article to examine the nature of judicial
review in this area, to consider the effects that it has had on the administration of the regulatory statutes involved, and to suggest changes
that will better effectuate sound policies.
t"Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Chairman, U.S. Tariff Commission, 1967-69. A.B. 1936, LL.B. 1938, Cornell University.
it Office of General Counsel, U.S. Tariff Commission. AB.1949, Pennsylvania State
University; LL.B. 1952, Columbia University. The views expressed herein are personal
to the authors and do not represent those of the U.S. Tariff Commission.
1 The Tariff Commission was established by the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463,
§§ 700-09, 39 Stat. 795.
2 The Customs Court was established by an Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, 44 Stat.
669. The predecessor of the Customs Court was the Board of General Appraisers which
was created by the Customs Administrative Act of 1890, ch. 407, §§ 12-14, 26 Stat. 137.
The Board was under the administrative supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury,
and from 1890 to 1926, it had jurisdiction over all protests from decisions of the collectors
of customs and appeals for reappraisement. The 1926 Act transferred to the Customs
Court all the jurisdiction and powers of the Board. The Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497,
§ 518, 46 Stat. 737, continued the Customs Court as constituted on June 17, 1930 with
changes.
8 The CCPA was established by the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 28,
36 Stat. 105, as the United States Court of Customs Appeals, and was given exclusive
jurisdiction over all appeals from final decisions of the Board of General Appraisers (the
predecessor of the Customs Court). From 1890 to 1909, the United States circuit courts
had jurisdiction over appeals from the Board under the Customs Administrative Act of
1890, ch. 407, § 15, 26 Stat. 138. By the terms of the 1909 Act, all pending cases in any
circuit court were transferred to the Court of Customs Appeals for decision. On March
2, 1929, the name of the court was changed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
and additional jurisdiction over decisions of the tribunals of the Patent Office was conferred on the court. Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475.
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I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE STATUTES

Although the Supreme Court has addressed itself to Tariff Commission actions and proceedings on only a few occasions, it has decided
a number of cases concerning the power of Congress to regulate foreign
trade and impose import duties as well as to delegate such authority.
In so doing, it has enunciated various principles which, in conjunction
with those enunciated in cases involving the Commission, constitute
the general legal framework within which Commission actions and
proceedings are effectuated.
As a bedrock principle, it has been established that the power of
Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations is complete; no
individual has a "vested right" to trade with foreign nations so as to
limit the power of Congress to determine what articles of merchandise
may be imported into the United States and the terms upon which
importation is permitted. 4 In short, a statute that restrains the introduction of particular goods into the United States because of congressional determinations of public policy does not violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.5 As a corollary, it has been established that
the power of Congress to lay and collect import duties can be utilized
for both revenue and protective purposes 6 and that no one has a legal
right to the maintenance of an existing rate of duty.7 There also appears to be no question that Congress may delegate to administrative
officials within the government, under very broadly-stated standards,
its authority to regulate foreign trade and to impose and modify import duties;8 furthermore, if Congress makes it clear that in the exercise of delegated authority there is no need to accord a hearing, no case
suggests that this constitutes a denial of constitutional due process. 9
As is apparent from these principles, congressional authority in
the field of foreign trade regulation is virtually unlimited. Any exist4 Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1933); The Abby Dodge,
223 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1912); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1904).
5 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 US. 470, 493 (1904).
6 McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414, 428 (1940); Board of Trustees v. United
States, 289 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1933); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
411-13 (1928).
7 Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318 (1933).
8 See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
See generally Frischer & Co. v. Elting, 60 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 649
(1932); 1 K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAw TREATISE ch. 2 (1958, Supp. 1965).
9 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 497 (1904). See also Cafeteria Workers Local
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
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ing limitations on its delegated authority are essentially self-imposed
rather than constitutionally required.
It is within this broad legal framework that the administration
of regulatory statutes prescribing Commission functions has been subjected to judicial review by the Customs Court and the CCPA. These
statutes call upon the Commission to conduct investigations so that it
may: (1) render certain advice to the President in a variety of cases,
and (2) notify the Secretary of the Treasury whether a domestic industry is being or is likely to be injured by imports sold at less than
their fair value. Upon receipt of such advice, and within statutory
limitations, the President may modify rates of duty or impose quantitative restrictions; upon notification of an injury determination, the
Secretary of the Treasury is required to issue a dumping finding
leading to the imposition of a dumping duty.
A. Requirement of Notice and Hearing
In the first category of cases, the type of investigation required of
the Commission varies with the type of advice to be rendered. Thus,
under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,10 the Commission conducts
such an investigation, with such notice and such hearing as it may
deem sufficient for a full presentation of the facts. It then advises the
President whether unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in
the importation of articles into the United States have the effect or
tendency to destroy, substantially injure, or prevent the establishment
of an efficiently and economically operated domestic industry, or to
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States. Under section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930,11 the Commission is required
to hold hearings upon reasonable public notice before advising the
President whether a change in the rate of import duty or in the basis of
valuation is necessary to equalize the costs of production of a domestic
article and the like or similar foreign article produced in the principal
competing country. It is also required to hold hearings upon notice
to interested parties under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 193312 before advising the President whether the imposition of
an import fee or quantitative limitation is necessary to assure that imports will not impair the effectiveness of a program or operation undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to an agricultural
commodity. Similarly, under the escape-clause provisions of the Trade
10 19 U.S.C. § 137 (1964).
11 Id. § 1536.

12 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1964).
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Expansion Act of 1962,13 reasonable notice and a public hearing are
prerequisites to the rendering of advice to the President on whether
an increase in, or imposition of, a duty or other import restriction is
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury to a domestic industry
from imports of a product like or directly competitive with that produced by the industry.
Under the Antidumping Act of 1921,14 which does not entail
presidential action, the Commission's notification to the Secretary of
the Treasury as to whether imports, found by the Secretary to have
been sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than fair value, are
adversely affecting a domestic industry need be preceded only by such
investigation as the Commission deems necessary.
B. Specific JudicialReview Procedures
The provisions under which the administration of these statutes
has been subjected to judicial review are numerous and for the most
part quite generally stated. Those contained in section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 are the most specific, and, as will be seen, have caused
the most difficulties. Section 337 provides that the testimony in every
Commission investigation under that section shall be reduced to writing, and a transcript thereof with the findings and recommendation of
the Commission shall be the official record of the case. If the findings
are supported by evidence, they are to be conclusive, except that, prior
to their submission to the President, an appeal may be taken from them
upon questions of law to the CCPA by the importer or consignee of
the articles involved. If it is shown to the satisfaction of the CCPA
that further evidence should be taken, and that there were reasonable
grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceedings
before the Commission, then the CCPA may order such additional
evidence to be taken. The Commission may then modify its findings
as to the facts or make new findings based on the additional evidence.
Such new findings, if supported by evidence, are to be conclusive as to
the facts, except that a further appeal may be taken to the CCPA upon
questions of law. The judgment of the CCPA is to be final with respect to the Commission's findings, but the ultimate determination
regarding exclusion of the merchandise is to be made by the President.
In short, the CCPA can "confirm" the Commission's findings, but
they are in the nature of recommendations to the President even after
confirmation.
13 19 U.S.c. § 1901 (1964), formerly Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ch.

141, § 7, 65 Stat. 74.
14 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1964).
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Judicial review of the administration of section 836 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, of the
escape-clause provisions, and of the Antidumping Act is conducted
pursuant to sections 501,15 514 to 515,16 and 51617 of the Tariff Act of
1930. Section 501 provides simply that the consignee of imported merchandise or his agent may file with the Customs Court an appeal from
the decision of the appraiser. Subsections 516(a) and (c) provide that
whenever an American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler believes
that the appraised value of any imported merchandise of a class or kind
manufactured, produced, or sold at wholesale by him is too low, he may
file an appeal for reappraisement in the same manner and with the
same effect as an appeal by a consignee under section 501. Sections 514
and 515 provide that an importer, consignee, or his agent may file with
the Customs Court an appeal from
all decisions of the collector, including the legality of all orders
and findings entering into the same, as to the rate and amount of
duties chargeable, and as to all exactions of whatever character
(within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury), and his
decisions excluding any merchandise from entry or delivery, under
any provision of the customs laws .... 18
Subsections 516(b) and (c) provide that whenever an American manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler believes that the proper rate of duty
is not being assessed on imported merchandise of a class or kind manufactured, produced, or sold at wholesale by him, he may file an appeal
with the Customs Court.
By statute, the Customs Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction
of these appeals,19 and the CCPA has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Customs Court.20 Appeals for reappraisement are decided
initially by a single judge of the Customs Court,21 whose decision may
be appealed first to a three-judge division of that court 22 and then to
the CCPA.23
15 Id. § 1501.
16 Id. §§ 1514-15.
17 Id. § 1516.

18 Id. § 1514.
19 28 U.S.C. §§ 1582-83 (1964). The appeals are required to be filed through the
collector of customs.
20 Id. § 1541.
21 Id. § 2631.
22 Id. § 2636. Appeals pursuant to §§ 514, 515, and 516(b)-(c) are decided initially
by a three-judge division of the Customs Court. The judges of the Customs Court have
been divided into three divisions, and the decisions of each division are decisions of the
Customs Court. Id. §§ 254, 2637.
23 Review by the CCPA on appeals for reappraisement is on questions of law only

(id. § 2637) but it is on questions of law and fact on appeals filed pursuant to §§ 514,
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As appears from the preceding, the appropriate provision pursuant to which the administration of the statutes has been subjected to
review depends on whether the protestant is an importer or domestic
producer, and whether the object of protest is the appraisement of merchandise or the rate of duty imposed on it. Appeals for review of administrative determinations under the Antidumping Act have been
filed by importers pursuant to section 501 or sections 514 and 515,
depending on whether the appeal has been from appraisement or from
imposition of the dumping duty. Although no appeal has been filed
by a domestic producer with respect to such determinations, it is possible that such an appeal could be filed under subsections 516(b) and
24
(c) or 516(a) and (c).

The filing of an appeal for review of an administrative determination under section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is a little more complicated. If the action taken by the President involved an increase in
the rate of duty, then the importer may appeal under sections 514 and
515. If it involved a change in the basis of valuation for the imported
article to the American selling price basis, 25 then he may appeal under

section 501. If the action taken involved a decrease in the rate of duty,
then the domestic producer may appeal under subsections 516(b) and
(c). Appeals for review of administrative determinations under section
22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the escape-clause provisions
have been filed by importers pursuant to sections 514 and 515, and
possibly could be filed-although none has been-by domestic producers pursuant to subsections 516(b) and (c).
Before continuing it should be noted that the provisions under
515, and 516(b)-(c). Id. § 2601. On October 1, 1970, the following changes became effective
in these judicial review procedures: (1) protests (as to appraisement, classification, and

rate and amount of duties chargeable) cannot be filed with the customs officer until the
entry involved has been liquidated; (2) if the protest is denied, the party may contest
the denial by bringing a civil action in the Customs Court; (3) such actions are to be
decided by a single judge of the Customs Court, except that upon application of any
party to the civil action, or upon his own initiative, the Chief Judge of the Customs
Court shall designate any three judges of the court to hear and determine any civil action that he finds (a) raises an issue of the constitutionality of an act of Congress, a
proclamation of the President, or an executive order, or (b) has broad or significant implications in the administration or interpretation of the customs laws; (4) actions before
the Customs Court may be consolidated by order of the court or by request of the parties,
with approval of the court, if there are common issues; and (5) appeals from final judgments or orders of the Customs Court (single judge or three judges, as the case may be)
are to be taken to the CCPA. The Customs Courts Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-271, §§ 103,
106, 108, 110, 117, 207 (June 2, 1970) (amending various sections of 19, 28 US.C.).
24 See North Am. Cement Corp. v. Anderson, 284 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
25 That is, the selling price of the domestic article. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401a(e), 1402(g)
(1964).
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which the Customs Court and CCPA have sought to examine the proceedings and actions of the Tariff Commission, and the attendant
presidential responses, are unsuitable vehicles for review.
There are various reasons why this is so. In the first place, proceedings before the Customs Court and the CCPA are essentially in
rem proceedings; what is litigated is the rate of duty on, or valuation
of, a specific importation. Consequently, each importation, even of the
same article, can be litigated. It has long been held by these courts, in
conformity with an early Supreme Court decision, 26 that the principle
27
of res judicata is virtually inapplicable in customs jurisprudence.
Thus, a determination of fact or law with respect to one importation
does not estop either the government, the same importer, or any other
importer from litigating with regard to the same issue or same kind of
goods in connection with another importation. Every importation, so
to speak, is entitled to its own day in court. Fortunately for these courts,
once a decision has been made with regard to an imported article, protests involving other importations of the same or similar articles are
28
usually resolved by stipulation of the parties involved.
Although res judicata is virtually nonexistent in customs jurisprudence, the principle of stare decisis is applicable. Its application,
however, is a matter that these courts have regarded as being entirely
within their discretion.2" Moreover, stare decisis is generally inapplicable where there is a change in, or addition to, the facts before the
court, or where an additional legal issue is raised.30 Consequently,
there have been repeated litigations involving identical merchandise
where the principle has not been applied.
The deficiencies inherent in these judicial procedures will become
abundantly clear from the following example. On June 24, 1931, the
26 United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225 (1927).

27 See United States v. Boone, 188 F.2d 808, 810-11 (C.C.P.A. 1951); United States v.
Jackson, 1 Ct. Cust. App. 25, 27 (1910); Charles H. Demarest, Inc. v. United States, 174
F. Supp. 380, 385 (Cust. Ct. 1959); S. Handal & Sons v. United States, Reap. Dec. 8775,
38 Cust. Ct. 620, 621 (1957).
28 There is, nonetheless, a large backlog of cases before these courts. Effective October
1, 1970, actions before the Customs Court may be consolidated by order of the court or
by request of the parties, with approval of the court, if there are common issues. The
Customs Courts Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-271, § 110(d) (June 2, 1970), amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1582 (1964).
29 A. Stein & Co. v. United States, 28 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 280, 285-86 (1941), citing
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910); Marianao Sugar Trading Corp. v. United
States, C.D. 1481, 29 Cust. Ct. 275, 278 (1952), aff'd, 41 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 236 (1954).
80 United States v. R.J. Saunders & Co., 42 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 128, 136 (1955); Golding-Keene Co. v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 947, 952 (Cust. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 48 C.C.P.A.
(Customs) 66 (1961); George S. Bush & Co. v. United States, C.D. 949, 15 Cust. Ct. 83,

86-87 (1945).
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President, pursuant to section 336, issued a proclamation increasing
the rate of duty on dried egg albumen. 81 A subsequent importation
became the subject of an importer's protest, which was overruled on
May 17, 1937, by the Customs Court,2 and the decision of that court
was affirmed by the CCPA on March 27, 1939, in David L. Moss Co.
v. United States.s Prior to the decisions in this case, there had been
protests of other entries of dried egg albumen. Two of these protests
were subsequently consolidated for trial. Since the merchandise and
the issue-whether there was substantial evidence before the Tariff
Commission to support its finding and the President's proclamationwere the same as in Moss, the record in that case was made a part of
the record of the protest being litigated. The importers urged that
since the Customs Court had made no findings of fact when the Moss
case was before it for consideration, and since the findings of fact by
members of the CCPA were inconclusive, the issue should be litigated
again. On June 29, 1944, the Customs Court, after once again considering the issue, overruled the protests in T.M. Duche & Sons v. United
States.3 4 No appeal was taken by the importers to the CCPA.
In 1947, however, the Customs Court was again called upon by
T.M. Duche &Sons to decide the same issue in connection with a protest made concerning a 1937 importation of dried egg albumen. Since
the issue, merchandise, and parties were the same, the record in the
case incorporated the record in the first Duche case, which in turn included the record in the Moss case.3 5 On January 15, 1947, some fourteen years after the proclamation, the Customs Court adhered to its
original position.86 An appeal was then taken to the CCPA, and on
November 2, 1948, that court affirmed the judgment of the lower
court.

87

This was not the end of the story, however. In 1951 the Customs
Court was'again called upon by the same importer to decide the same
issue with regard to the same product. This time the importer injected
31

Pres. Proc. No. 1956, 47 Stat. 2460 (1931).
82 David L. Moss Co. v. United States, T.D. 48985, 71 TREAS. DEC. 825 (1937), affd,

103 F.2d 395 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
83 103 F2d 395 (C.C.PA. 1939).
34 C.D. 863, 13 Cust. Ct. 26 (1944).
35 The importer stated to the court that it had been his intention to appeal the
first Duche case, but that such an appeal had been inadvertently overlooked, and the
present case was presented in order to proceed to a review in the event the Customs Court
reaffirmed its prior conclusions.
86 T.M. Duche & Sons v. United States, C.D. 1040, 18 Cust. Ct. 25 (1947), aff'd, 36
C.C.P.A. (Customs) 19 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 931 (1949).
87 T.M. Duche & Sons v. United States, 36 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 19 (1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 931 (1949).
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a new element: a contention that provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)38 required the Customs Court to review
the Commission proceedings that preceded the 1931 proclamation of
the President to determine if there was substantial evidence in the
record to support his proclamation. If the court had decided that the
APA had increased its scope of review, the main issue to be resolved
would have been the same issue that had been raised in the second
Duche case. Thus, the record in the case before the court incorporated
the record in that case (which in turn had incorporated the record in
the first Duche case, which in turn had incorporated the record in the
Moss case). On February 14, 1951, the Customs Court overruled the
protest of the importer.39 Finally, on March 18, 1952, about twenty40
one years after the President's proclamation, the CCPA affirmed.
II
JuDIcIAL RE iEW IN ACTION

Under these variegated statutory schemes, there has been a substantial amount of litigation involving Commission actions and proceedings and the ultimate determinations of the President and the
Secretary of the Treasury. While a large portion of this litigation has
related to the administration of sections 31541 and 31642 of the Tariff
Act of 1922-the predecessors to sections 336 and 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930-the earlier sections were for the most part quite similar
to the existing provisions, and the cases involving the former tend to
be equally relevant to the administration of the latter.
A. Section 336 Cases
The litigation that has most determined the functions of the Commission and the President in this area of foreign trade regulation, and
that has most limited the scope of judicial review of those functions,
has involved section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922, and its successor,
section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930. It will be recalled that pursuant
to this provision the Commission advises the President whether an in8 5 US.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (Supp. V, 1970).
89 T.M. Duche & Sons v. United States, CiD. 1800, 26 Cust. Ct. 61 (1951), aff'd, 39

C.C.PA. (Customs) 186, cert. denied, 344 US. 830 (1952).
40 T.M. Duche & Sons v. United States, 39 C.C.PA. (Customs) 186, cert. denied, 344

U.S. 830 (1952).
41 Ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 941 (1922).
42 Id. § 316, 42 Stat. 943.
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crease or decrease in import duty is necessary in order to equalize the
production costs of a domestic article and a similar foreign article.
Not only has there been a substantial amount of such litigation before
the Customs Court and the CCPA, but the Supreme Court has had
occasion to consider these provisions, and in doing so has established
general principles for judicial review in the foreign trade area. As we
shall see, however, the Customs Court and the CCPA have not been
consistent in their application of these principles.
The most important of the early Supreme Court opinions was
rendered by Justice Cardozo in Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v.
United States.43 In 1923, at a Commission hearing in connection with
an investigation instituted under section 315 upon a petition filed by
a domestic producer (the American Nitrogen Products Company), an
importer (the Norwegian Nitrogen Products Company) requested that
it be permitted to examine the cost data submitted in confidence by
the American company to the Commission, and that it be allowed to
cross-examine witnesses and Commission employees with respect to
such data. The Commission denied these requests. The Norwegian
company thereupon applied to the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia for a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to disclose the information sought. The petition was dismissed, the court
ruling that the action of the Commission had been in conformity with
the law. 44 Shortly thereafter, the Commission made its report to the
President, who proclaimed an increase in the rate of duty on sodium
nitrite. 45 Notwithstanding the action of the President, the Norwegian
company took an appeal from the lower court's decision to the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, which held that the case had
become moot. 46 The court nevertheless expressed an opinion not called

for by its decision; it stated that in being denied access to the confidential information sought, the Norwegian company had been deprived
of the right to be heard contemplated by section 315. On writ of error,
the Supreme Court concluded, in United States ex rel. Norwegian
Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States Tariff Commission,4 that because the case had become moot, it was unnecessary to discuss the
merits.
43 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
44 Unreported, but discussed and affirmed on appeal in United States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States Tariff Comm'n, 6 F.2d 491, 491-94 (D.C. Cir.
1925), modified & aff'd, 274 U.S. 106 (1927).
45 Pres. Proc. of May 6, 1924, 43 Stat. 1949.
46 United States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States Tariff
Cornm'n, 6 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1925), modified & aff'd, 274 US. 106 (1927).
47 274 US. 106 (1927).
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After the increased rate of duty proclaimed by the President had
gone into effect, the Norwegian company imported more sodium nitrite and filed protests with regard to the assessment of the higher,
proclaimed rate, alleging that it had been denied the hearing prescribed by the statute, and that the President's proclamation was therefore invalid. The protests were overruled by the Customs Court,48 and
the judgment of that court was affirmed by the CCPA.49 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and in February 1933 Justice Cardozo delivered his landmark opinion. 0 Citing J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
Statesr1 where the Supreme Court in 1928 had held section 315 constitutional, he found that what was done by the Tariff Commission
and the President in changing the tariff rates was in substance a delegation of the legislative process. Therefore, he concluded, the inference
was strong that the kind of hearing assured by the statute was a hearing
of the same order as that given by congressional committees when the
legislative process was in the hands of Congress. Since advocates of a
measure were not permitted to cross-examine the opponents (or the
opponents the advocates) in congressional hearings, nor were congressional committees required to submit to an inquisition as to data collected by their members, it followed that such practices were not
required before the Commission. Moreover, he continued, nothing in
the statute suggested that every producer or importer was to be viewed
as the adversary of every other, with the rights of examination and
cross-examination extended to each of them.
In a further endeavor to ascertain the intent of Congress, Justice
Cardozo compared the functions of the Commission and the President
under section 315 with the regulatory functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the public service commissions of the states:
The Tariff Commission advises; these others ordain.... Whatever
the appropriate label, the kind of order that emerges from a hearing before a body with power to ordain is one that impinges upon
legal rights in a very different way from the report of a commission
which merely investigates and advises. The traditionary forms of
hearing appropriate to the one body are unknown to the other.
What issues from the Tariff Commission as a report and recommendation to the President, may be accepted, modified or rejected.
If it happens to be accepted, it does not bear fruit in anything that
48 Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, T.D. 44824, 59 TREAs. DEC. 921
(1931), afl'd, 20 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 27 (1932), modified &"aff'd, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
49 Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 20 C.C.PA. (Customs) 27 (1932),
modified & aff'd, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
50 Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).

51 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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trenches upon legal rights. No one has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty. Neither the action of Congress
in fixing a new tariff nor that of the President in exercising his
delegated power is subject to impeachment if52 the prescribed forms
of legislation have been regularly observed.
He concluded:
[W]ithin the meaning of this act the "hearing" assured to one
affected by a change of duty does not include a privilege to ransack
the records of the Commission, and to subject its confidential agents
to an examination as to all that they have learned. There was no
thought to revolutionize the practice of investigating bodies generally and of this one in particular. Hearings had once been
optional. By the new statute they became mandatory. The form
remained the same. 53
As is apparent from Justice Cardozo's opinion, there were essentially two factors that led to his determination: (1) the investigatory,
advisory function of the Commission, and (2) the function of the governmental official, in this case the President, to whom the advice was
rendered. It is interesting that in his opinion he combined these factors to support his holding even though the President's ultimate action
did not "trench upon legal rights." Neither that fact alone nor the
Commission's purely advisory role54 was found to be a sufficient reason,
viewed independently, for denial of a trial-type hearing.55
The section 815 cases decided by the Customs Court and the
CCPA prior to and immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in Norwegian Nitrogen were in accordance with that case. In
William A. Foster & Co. v. United States,56 the CCPA, in affirming the
judgment of the Customs Court upholding presidential action, stated,
first, that it had jurisdiction to determine whether the President had
complied with the section 815 conditions and limitations in issuing
his proclamation," and, second, that it regarded the Commission's
report to the President as immaterial and properly excluded from
evidence by the Customs Court. In so holding, it was careful to point
out that "[t]here may be cases where such reports may be competent
to prove essential jurisdictional facts," and that it was not holding
52 288 U.S. at 318.
53 Id. at 319.
54 See Hannah v. Larche, 863 U.S. 420, 440-52 (1960).

55 Perhaps here were the seeds of uncertainty concerning the scope of review later
displayed by the Customs Court and the COPA in § 336 cases.
56 20 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 15 (1932).

57 That is, whether the proclamation was preceded by a Commission investigation
involving notice and a hearing, and whether the President's action was within the pre.
scribed rate limitations in the statute.
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"that any sort of an investigation by the Tariff Commission, however
irrelevant, will justify a following proclamation by the President under
this section."5 8 But the CCPA nonetheless concluded:
The United States Customs Court and this court are not given
power, by statute, to review the proceedings of the United States
Tariff Commission under this section.... Not having provided
directly for such a review, it was certainly not the intent of the
lawmakers that we should so review such hearings, collaterally and
indirectly... .We are not permitted to write into the law something
which is not there.5 9
In another case, United States v. Fox River Butter Co.,6 0 the CCPA
again held that the Customs Court did not err in its rejection of the
Commission's report as irrelevant evidence. It stated that "the duty
devolved upon the President to make the findings contemplated by
the statute, and it is immaterial what opinions were entertained by the
investigators, or by the members of the Tariff Commission, as a result
of such an investigation." 61
These two cases involved the provisions of section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922, which required as a condition precedent to the issuance
of a presidential proclamation an investigation by the Commission,
but did not limit the President in making his findings to the informadon acquired by the Commission or in proclaiming tariff changes to
the changes recommended by the Commission in its report. On the
other hand, section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the successor to section 315, specified that
[t]he President shall by proclamation approve the rates ... and
changes... in any report of the commission under this section, if
in his judgment such rates of duty and changes are shown by such
be necessary to equalize such
investigation of the commission to
62
differences in costs of production.
58 20 C.C.P.A. (Customs) at 26. "An investigation of cotton goods . . . would not

be a sufficient prerequisite for a change in duties in the woolen schedule." Id. at 26-27.
59 Id. at 27.
60 20 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 38, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 628 (1932).
61 Id. at 44.
02 19 U.S.C. § 1836(c) (1964). As under § 315, no rate could be increased or decreased
by more than 50%. Id. § 1336(a). But if the Commission found that the maximum increase or decrease would not equalize the difference in the costs of production, it would
so state in its report to the President. The President could then change the basis of
valuation for the imported article to the American selling price basis and, if necessary,
decrease the rate of duty by not more than 50% to equalize the difference. Id. § 1336(b).
He could not both change the basis of valuation and increase the rate. Furthermore, he was not authorized to change the form of duty for an article and was prohibited
from transferring an article from the dutiable list of the Tariff Act to the free list, or
vice versa. Id. § 1336(g).
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Under this section, although the President was still to make the ultimate determinations, he was limited to proclaiming only those changes
recommended by the Commission, and in making such determinations
he was confined, at least by statute, to the information on which such
recommendations were based. The basic nature of the functions of
the Commission-advisory-and the President--discretionary-remained the same, however, subject only to those additional statutory
limitations or conditions.
Both the Customs Court and the CCPA .lost sight of this when
deciding cases during the 1930's. In an early section 336 case, the CCPA
seemed to be cognizant of the nature of these functions. In United
States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,63 it reversed the Customs Court, stating
that "if it appears that the President has complied with the mandates
of the law, the findings of fact upon which the proclamation is based
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by us."16 4 However,
before the CCPA's decision in Sears was handed down, the Customs
Court decided another case, Dutchess Hat Works v. United States,65
in which it held that the President's "proclamation was based upon
conclusions of the Tariff Commission founded upon facts which upon
their face show that they were ascertained in a manner unauthorized
by statute," and that therefore "such conclusions and the proclamation
of the President were ultra vires, void, and of no effect. "66 Again, the
CCPA reversed,6 7 but in doing so it expressed itself much more carefully than it had in the Sears case:
We think it immaterial, so far as the question of the validity of
said proclamation is concerned, what report the Commission may
have made as to the results of its investigation or what findings it
may have made, other than its finding that the rates specified by it
were necessary to equalize the differences in costs of production of
the merchandise under investigation. If the President, upon an examination of all the facts before the Commission, had any legal
basis for a finding that such rates were necessary to equalize costs
of production, his proclamation is valid.
...

The record does not show that there were not facts before

03 20 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 295 (1932), cert. denied, 290 US. 633 (1933) (decided before
the Court's decision in Norwegian Nitrogen).
64 Id. at 301, citing United States v. S. Leon & Co., 20 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 49, cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 628 (1932), which had involved presidential action under § 315 of the
Tariff Act of 1922.
65 T.D. 45974, 62 TREAS. DEC. 440 (1932), rev'd sub nom. Feltex Corp. v. Dutchess
Hat Works, 71 F.2d 322 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
06 Id. at 448.
67 Feltex Corp. v. Dutchess Hat Works, 71 F.2d 322 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
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the Commission upon which he might properly make the proclamation here in question. 68
By seeking evidence in the record of the proceedings before the
Commission, the CCPA had to some degree gone behind the President's
determination, which earlier it had held was final and not subject to
review so long as it was in compliance with the "mandates of the law."
This tended to complicate matters. On the one hand, there was still
a recognition by these courts that the function of the Commission was
investigatory and advisory, but, on the other hand, less significance
was given to the fact that the authority vested in the President by Congress was discretionary. 69
Having once gone behind the determination of the President,
the CCPA had opened the door to substitute its judgment for his. In
Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States,70 decided two months after Dutchess
Hat, the Customs Court was faced with the question whether it could
determine if certain binoculars, which were the subject of Commission
findings and a subsequent proclamation of the President, were covered
by the Commission's notice of hearing. The notice covered "optical
instruments of a class or type used by the [armed forces] for fire control." The Commission found that certain foreign-made prism binoculars
were such optical instruments and that a change in the basis of valuation was necessary to equalize the different costs of production of
foreign and domestic instruments. The President agreed with the Commission and proclaimed the change. 71 The Commission's report to the
President had contained, however, various statements referring to such
binoculars as being suitable for use by the armed forces. The importer
alleged that notwithstanding the language used, which followed the
language in the notice, the Commission's findings in fact related to
binoculars suitable for use. Therefore, the notice of hearing was inadequate and the findings of the Commission and the proclamation of
the President were invalid. The Customs Court decided against the
importer. 72 On appeal, however, the CCPA held:
68 Id. at 330-31 (emphasis in original).
09 Moreover, these courts did not appear to appreciate fully that the hearing required of the Commission in the performance of its function did not require making
confidential information a matter of record, and in fact the practice of the Commission
had long been to withhold material that it considered to be confidential.
70 Reap. Dec. 3337, 65 Tpmxs. DEc. 1734 (1934), rev'd, 76 F.2d 412 (C.C.P.A. 1935).
71 Pres. Proc. No. 2020, 47 Stat. 2545 (1932).
72 We do not believe . .. that it is within the power of the court to go behind
the findings made by the Commission-at least, so far as to weigh the evidence
submitted to us and thereby decide that such evidence outweighs any evidence
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We think it clearly appears from the report of the Tariff Commission that its investigation was not confined to the matters contained in its public notice, that is, to the differences in the costs of
production of foreign and similar domestic optical instruments of
the class or type used by the Army, Navy, or their respective Air
Forces, but was, in fact, extended in scope so as to include the
differences in costs of production of foreign and domestic optical
instruments suitable for use by such armed forces; that its findings
and recommendations included in its report to the President were
not limited to the scope of the Senate Resolution and the public
notice of the hearing, but were based upon evidence relative to
optical instruments suitable for such use; and that the findings and
recommendations of the Commission were therefore invalid.
For the reasons stated, we must hold that the proclamation of
the President was without authority of law, illegal, and void ....

73

In November 1936, over a year after it decided the Zeiss case, the
CCPA markedly changed its approach to its review function. It was
presented, in Union Fork & Hoe Co. v. United States,7 4 with these
questions: (1) whether a report of the Commission on its face showed
sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 336; (2) whether
the Tariff Commissioners could be examined by the litigant on communications they had made to the President, aside from the written
report; and (3) whether the litigant could examine the extent of their
investigation of the cost of production of competing articles manufactured in the principal competing country. The alleged objective of
these interrogations was to show that the Tariff Commission did not
investigate the cost of production of articles that were like or similar
to the domestic product. In holding against the party litigant and affirming the judgment of the Customs Court, the CCPA stated:
The weight of this report was a matter for the consideration
of the President. We have neither the inclination nor the right to
review the same for the purpose of ascertaining whether the findings of the commission were correct....
If it were given to this court to decide whether, in the case at
bar, as a matter of fact, the commission came to the right conclusion on this point, the court might give its views as to whether or
not such articles were like or similar. The facts shown by the inwhich the Commission had before it and which has not been and cannot be
submitted to this court.
65 TpEAs. DEc. at 1737.
73 Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 76 F.2d 412, 417-18 (C.C.P.A. 1935) (emphasis in

original).
74 86 F.2d 423 (C.C.P.A. 1936).
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vestigation, however, were for the President to pass upon, and are
not a matter for the consideration of this court.
The communications which the individual members of the
United States Tariff Commission may make, or fail to make, to the
President, aside from the report and findings of the commission
as specified by law, are not matters of public record, and, in our
opinion, are not subject to investigation by this court.7 5
The CCPA did not long maintain such a constricted view of its
review function. In a little over two years after its decision in Union
Fork, it had before it David L. Moss Co. v. United States,7 in which
the Customs Court had held "that it was without authority to review
the findings of the Commission or to disturb the conclusion of the
President based thereon." The CCPA disagreed with the lower court
on the point. Acknowledging that "the proclamation of the President
makes a prima facie showing of authority," the court noted that "if it
is established before the court that there was no substantial evidence
before the Commission upon which action complained of could have
been based, such action must be held void because not within the authority granted by Congress." In the court's view this did not mean
that it "may review the facts or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commission." But it did mean that "where the question is properly
raised, it must determine whether the Commission acted within the
scope of the authority granted it by Congress and that, in determining
this question, it must consider whether the Commission had before it
77
any substantial evidence upon which to base its action.1
75 Id. at 428-29. The rationale of the CCPA in this case appears to be inconsistent

with that of its decision in the Zeiss case, even though the court undertook to distinguish
Zeiss by stating that it involved a failure by the Commission to give proper notice. Id.
at 428.
76 103 F.2d 395 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
77 Id. at 397-99. After examining the Commission's report and the testimony at the
Commission's hearing, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. It was, how-

ever, evenly divided as to whether there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings and the action taken by the President. Two of the five judges found
that there was substantial evidence; two found that there was not; and one judge was

of the opinion that the court had no jurisdiction to review the evidence.
The court attempted to distinguish its holding in Union Fork by stating:
What was there decided was that the court could not examine the evidence before the Commission for the purpose of reviewing its findings and conclusions,
not that it could not look to the evidence to ascertain whether the action complained of had substantial support therein so as to be within the authority
granted the Commission.
Id. at 99. The very different language used by the court in the Union Fork and Moss
cases makes it dear, however, that the court had indeed taken a more expansive approach
to its review function.
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About three months later the CCPA had an opportunity to exercise further this expanded scope of judicial review in George S. Bush
& Co. v. United States.78 Section 336 provided that, in ascertaining
differences in costs of production, the Commission could when necessary accept as evidence of foreign production costs "the weighted average of invoice prices or values for a representative period." 79 The
importer contended that, in making its findings, the Commission had
misconstrued this statutory provision by converting invoice prices for
one period into United States dollars at the average rate of exchange
for another period, and that, therefore, the Commission's findings and
the President's proclamation were invalid. The Customs Court overruled these contentions on the same basis that it had decided the Moss
case.
On appeal, the CCPA reversed. Noting that "[a] legal investigation by the Tariff Commission is a condition precedent to the issuance
of a lawful proclamation by the President," it observed that "[i]t clearly
appears from the commission's report that its investigation of the cost
of production of the foreign article and its findings with respect thereto
were based upon an erroneous conception of the statutory provision."
Therefore, the court held that "the investigation made by the Tariff
Commission was illegal" and "the proclamation by the President,
based upon such investigation, was without authority of law, illegal,
and void."' 0
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in 1940 reversed the
CCPA. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas stated
flatly that "the scope of appellate jurisdiction conferred by § 501 of
the Tariff Act of 1930 ...does not permit judicial examination of the
judgment of the President that the rates of duty recommended by the
Commission are necessary to equalize the differences in the domestic
It also attempted to distinguish the holding of the Supreme Court in the Norwegian Nitrogen case by stating:
The decision in that case was that the provision for a hearing before the Commission did not give a right to the inspection of matter furnished it as confidential information. The case arose under the flexible provisions of the 1922 act;
and much was said in the course of the opinion that has no application to proceedings under the 1930 act, which . . . limits the President in the exercise of

his judgment to a consideration of the facts developed before the Commission
in the course of its investigation.
Id.
78

104 F.2d 368 (C.C.P.A. 1989), rev'd, 810 U.S. 371 (1940).

79 19 U.S.C. § 1336(e)(2)(A) (1964).
80 104 F.2d at 373-74.
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and foreign costs of production." 8' Noting that the powers entrusted
to the President by the 1930 Tariff Act did not differ in kind from
those granted under earlier tariff acts, he called attention to the Commission's role "as an adviser to the Congress or to the President," and
held that its section 336 role was no different. The Commission does
not, he observed, "increase or decrease the rates of duty"; it investigates, and submits the facts and its recommendations to the President.
It is "the judgment of the President on those facts which is determinative of whether or not the recommended rates will be promulgated."
The action of the Commission and the President being "but one stage
of the legislative process," the judgment of the President that on the
facts, adduced in pursuance of the procedure prescribed by Congress,
a change of rate is necessary, "is no more subject to judicial review
under this statutory scheme than if Congress itself had exercised that
' 2
judgment."
Prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in Bush, the CCPA
tied together the loose ends that remained from its earlier opinions by
overruling Moss in T.M. Duche & Sons v. United States, 3 citing the
Bush and Norwegian Nitrogen cases in support of its decision. The
enactment in 1946 of the Administrative Procedure Act,8 4 however,
raised an additional question concerning judicial review of Tariff
Commission activities. In the second Duche case, 5 the CCPA resolved
this issue in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Court.
The importer-litigant in the latter Duche case contended that
section 10 of the APA required the Customs Court and CCPA to review the proceedings before the Commission to determine if there
was substantial evidence in the record.88 Holding that the APA did
81 United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 379 (1940) (footnote omitted).
Section 501 (Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 501, 46 Stat. 730) limited CCPA review of
Customs Court decisions to "a question or questions of law." The relevant subsection of
§ 501 is presently located in 28 U.S.C. § 2637 (1964).
82 310 U.S. at 379-80. The Court stated further:
For the judiciary to probe the reasoning which underlies this Proclamation
would amount to a clear invasion of the legislative and executive domains. Under
the Constitution it is exclusively for Congress, or those to whom it delegates
authority, to determine what tariffs shall be imposed. Here the President acted
in full conformity with the statute. No question of law is raised when the exercise of his discretion is challenged.
Id. at 380.
83 36 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 19 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 931 (1949).
84 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (Supp. V, 1970).
85 T.M. Duche & Sons v. United States, 39 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 186, cert. denied, 344
U.S. 830 (1952).
88 Section 10 provides:
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"not authorize a judicial review of the proceedings before the Tariff
Commission or of the discretionary acts of the President," the CCPA
8 7
affirmed the decision of the Customs Court against the importer.
Although the CCPA's decision was in conformity with the Bush and
Norwegian Nitrogen cases, it was premised on the uncertain rationale
of the latter case and consequently did not remove all of the confusion
attending judicial review of section 336 actions. As in Norwegian Nitrogen, the court expressed itself in terms of the Commission's end
product and its legal effect if accepted by the President rather than,
as in the Bush case, in terms of the discretionary nature of the President's function. Thus, it found subsection 10(a) of the APA, regarding
standing to review agency action, dispositive of the issue involved.
But the importer had been given, pursuant to section 501 or sections
514 and 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the right to appeal from the
appraisement of the imported merchandise or the duty imposed on
it, and the APA was not intended to remove that right. Hence, the
applicability of subsection 10(a) should not have been determinative of
the scope of review.8 8 The court could have removed this uncertainty
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by
law committed to agency discretion(a) . . . Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any
relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
*. . So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of any agency action. It shall . . . hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements
of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute ....
Cb 324, § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946).
87 39 C.C.P.A. (Customs) at 191-92. The CCPA stated:
Appellant's contention that it is entitled to a judicial review of the procedure of the Tariff Commission under the Administrative Procedure Act is predicated upon its claim that it is "a person suffering legal wrong because of any
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action." We think appellant has suffered no legal wrong because, as stated by the Supreme Court in
the Norwegian Nitrogen Products case . . . "No one has a legal right to the
maintenance of an existing rate of duty." The action of the Tariff Commission
being advisory only, its advice that the rate of duty should be increased cannot
be considered to "adversely affect" appellant because it is only when the President acts upon that advice that appellant could be affected and, as ... set out
[in Bush], the action of the President "is no more subject to judicial review under this statutory scheme than if Congress itself had exercised that judgment."
Id. at 191.
88 Moreover, if, as the CCPA seemed to indicate in its earlier cases, the proceedings
under § 886 were rule making required by statute to be made on the record, then the
ie

.
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by addressing itself to the introductory clause of section 10 which provided for judicial review "except so far as agency action is committed
to agency discretion." If it had done so, acting in accordance with the
Bush case, there would have been no need for it to have considered
subsection 10(a).
The confusion that existed during the 1930's and for a period of
time thereafter emanated from a failure on the part of the CCPA to
comprehend the nature of the functions vested by the Congress in the
Commission and the President, and was abetted by the uncertain rationale of NorwegianNitrogen. Within the confines of certain statutory
mandates, the Commission's actions under section 336 are advisory to
the President, and the President's actions have been committed by
Congress to his sole discretion. Hence, in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, judicial review should have been limited to an
examination of compliance with these mandates-that is, whether the
Commission had held hearings upon notice and whether the President's
actions were within the statutory rate and value limitations and the
scope of notice. Where, as in Zeiss and Bush, the CCPA chose to look
beyond the notice and findings of the Commission and the action of
the President, it was in effect passing upon the Commission's advice
and substituting its judgment for that of the President. Yet, the only
limitations or conditions specified in the delegation of these functions
are the aforementioned statutory mandates. To have proclaimed tariff
changes in disregard, or in violation, of these mandates would have
constituted action in excess of the delegated authority. Once within the
area of discretion, however, no question of law is raised by a challenge
to the exercise of that discretion. This is in effect the holding of the
Bush case, which, though prior in time, is in accord with the review
provisions of the APA.
Since the 1952 Duche case there has been no litigation involving
judicial review of presidential determinations under section 336. In
the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Congress provided that section
336 was not to apply to any article that was the subject of a trade agreement concession. 89 The evolution of the trade agreements program
substantial evidence rule should have been applicable, absent language to the contrary
in the APA.
Needless to say, such proceedings are not rule making required by statute to be
made on the record; the changes proclaimed by the President under § 336 are not required to be based upon the evidence adduced at the Commission's hearings. See ATroRNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Act 32-35 (1947).
89 19 U.S.C. § 1352(a) (1964).
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has meant that there are fewer and fewer articles not covered by such
concessions. Consequently, there have been only a few Commission
investigations under the section, and no action has been taken by the
President.
Although the confusion that attended judicial review of section
336 actions has ceased with the virtual absence of Commission activity
under the section, the litigation is of more than historical significance
because of the similarity in the administrative functions involved under section 336 and those under the other regulatory statutes in which
the Tariff Commission plays a role. As will be seen, much the same
confusion has been present in the judicial review of the administration
of these other statutory provisions.
B. Section 337 Cases
While section 336 makes no provision for judicial review, section
337 does contain specific provisions for review by the CCPA of the
findings of the Commission, but not of the President. However, while
under section 336 a Commission investigation and report are a condition precedent to presidential action, and such action is limited to
changes recommended by the Commission, under section 337 the
President is not limited in any way by Commission findings or recommendations. 90 Moreover, his actions are conclusive. Thus, CCPA review of Commission findings under section 337 is essentially a review
of Commission advice that the President may or may not heed. Whatever effect review by the CCPA has had on the administration of section 337 has not resulted from any judgment invalidating presidential
action, but rather from its determinations affirming or reversing Commission findings and from the President's adoption of findings that
have been affirmed, or from his rejection of findings that have been
reversed. The confusion that has attended such "review" has related
to the scope of the advisory authority of the Commission, and the authority of the CCPA to exercise a review function under the peculiar
circumstances described.
The "advisory review" function of the CCPA was first questioned
in 1928 in connection with certain Commission findings made under
section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922,11 the predecessor of section 337.
The Commission found that certain phenolic resin articles, imported
into and sold in the United States, infringed certain United States
90 Id. § 1337. In other words, the President may act under § 337 independently of
the Commission. It should be noted, however, that the President has never excluded
merchandise under § 337 except upon recommendation by the Commission.
91 Ch. 856, § 316, 42 Stat. 943 (1922).
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patents, and that such importation and sale constituted an "unfair"
method of competition and an "unfair" act.9 2 Pursuant to the provisions of section 316, the importer appealed the Commission's findings
to the Court of Customs Appeals (now the CCPA). The domestic producer moved for an order dismissing the appeal upon the ground that
the court lacked jurisdiction. He contended that the Court of Customs
Appeals was an inferior court created by the Congress under Article
III of the United States Constitution; that, therefore, it could decide
only "cases and controversies"; and that the matter before the court
93
was not a case or controversy. The court, in In re Frischer & Co.,
agreed with the producer on his first two contentions but concluded
that the matter was, in fact, a case or controversy in the Article III
sense.9 4
The appellee petitioned the Supreme Court 95 for a writ of certiorari and, at about the same time, for a writ prohibiting the Court of
Customs Appeals from entertaining the appeal from the Commission's
findings. The petition for certiorari was denied, 6 as was the petition
for prohibition. 7 In denying the latter, however, the Court passed on
the question of the status of the Court of Customs Appeals. It held
that the court was a legislative and not a constitutional court; thus,
there was no need to decide whether the proceeding under section 316
was a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution."
In so holding the Supreme Court preserved the confusion that
was inherent in the statute. If no question of law is raised when the
exercise of the President's discretion is challenged, then what question
of law is raised when the Commission's findings are challenged-find92 Synthetic Phenolic Resin, Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 3164 (May 25, 1927).
93 16 Ct. Cust. App. 191 (1928).
94 [I]f it be adjudged that the defendants or respondents in the pending case are
violators of the law under consideration, that determination "will not be merely
ancillary and advisory," but will be a "final and indisputable basis of action"

for future proceedings....
... [O]ur judgment in this case ...
declares or denies the existence of a
right or a status (and does so conclusively and finally) which in turn affects a
valuable interest or right, and otherwise meets the requirements of a "case"
and "controversy" ....
Id. at 211.
95 Section 316 provided that the judgment of the Court of Customs Appeals "shall
be subject to review by the United States Supreme Court upon certiorari applied for
within three months after such judgment." Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 316(c), 42 Stat.
944. This provision was not included in § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
96 Bakelite Corp. v. Frisher & Co., 278 U.S. 641 (1928).
97 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.. 438 (1929).
98 Id. at 460-61.
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ings that can be completely ignored by the President in exercising his
discretion? Section 316, and subsequently section 337, provided for
review by the CCPA on questions of law only. What then was the
CCPA to review? All it could determine under sections 316 and 337
was what the Commission should or should not advise the President,
not what the President could or could not do. As was to be stated in
a later Supreme Court opinion,9 the CCPA had been vested with an
extrajudicial revisory authority.
Following the Supreme Court's decision on the writ of prohibition, the CCPA proceeded to consider the appeal by the importer from
the Commission's findings regarding phenolic resin articles. In "affirming" these findings, the court passed on the constitutionality of the
statute and declared that the Commission had no right to pass upon
the validity of the patents involved, but that it could initially determine whether such patents had been infringed and could regard such
infringement as an unfair method or act. It then held, after analogizing Tariff Commission findings to Federal Trade Commission orders,
that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's affirmative findings, 00 and stated that "[w]hat constitutes
unfair methods of competition or unfair acts is ultimately a question
of law for the court and not for the Commission."' 0 1
The CCPA had clearly misconstrued its, and the Commission's,
functions under section 316. The Commission's findings are legally
determinative of nothing; they constitute only advice to the President.
Therefore, the court's statement that "[t]he right to pass upon the
validity of a patent which has been issued by the Patent Office is a
right possessed only by the courts of the United States given jurisdiction thereof by law"'1 2 was completely irrelevant to the question of
what advice the Commission could or should give to the President. If
the Commission is not permitted to advise the President as to its opinion concerning the validity or invalidity of the patent involved, how
is it to advise the President whether the patent is being infringed?
Equally confusing was the rationale of the court in applying the substantial evidence rule to the Commission's findings. The analogy it
sought to draw between the Federal Trade Commission and the Tariff
Commission did not exist. The Tariff Commission, unlike the FTC,
does not issue orders-it renders advice. Finally, what constitutes un99 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 870 U.S. 530 (1962).
'00

Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F-2d 247 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 282 U.S.

852 (1930).
101 Id. at 259.
102 Id. at 258.
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fair methods or acts under section 337 is not "ultimately a question of
law for the court," but a question ultimately for the President.103
Following the CCPA's decision, the Commission transmitted its
findings to the President, and in October 1980, the President made
permanent the temporary import prohibition that had been in effect
since 1926 pending the completion of the Commission's investigation
and the making of its report.10 4 The importer then filed a bill in equity
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York to restrain
the collector of customs at the port of New York from excluding such
merchandise. The importer argued (1) that section 316 was unconstitutional, and (2) that the Commission's findings and the President's
order were unlawful because the Commission assumed authority to
determine that the merchandise infringed patents and that the infringements were unfair acts mentioned in section 816. The district court
dismissed the bill because of lack of jurisdiction, holding that the
remedy in the CCPA was exclusive.1 0 5 The court of appeals affirmed
the dismissal but passed on the constitutionality of the section.10 6 The
court acknowledged that the terms in the section were general and
vague, but held that the section was constitutional, citing, among others, the Hampton case. Furthermore, the court agreed with the lower
court that section 816 contemplated no further remedy than provided
for therein. 0 7 A writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was subse103 The futility of these review proceedings for deciding questions of law as distinguished from questions of advice was acknowledged by only one judge on the CCPAJudge Garrett. In a long and cogent dissenting opinion, he stated:
Our decision has not the force and effect of law; a conclusion expressed in terms
of affirmation or reversal, using the nomenclature customary in court procedure,
means nothing, so far as binding individuals in any legal sense is concerned ....
By its own force such judgment can exercise no control over the actions of the
executive under the section.

The decision of this court is in precisely the same category as the Commission's report, so far as any legal effect is concerned.
Id. at 263, 269.
104 T.D. 44441, 58 TREAs. DEC. 722 (1930).
105 Unreported, but discussed on appeal in Frischer & Co. v. Elting, 60 F.2d 711,
711-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 649 (1932).
106 Frischer & Co. v. Elting, 60 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 649 (1932).
107 It is evident ... that the President is given full power to determine what acts
are unfair and injurious to industry. On the face of the statute, the Commission
is only employed to "assist the President in making . . . decisions" and not to
bind him. A review of their auxiliary findings by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals is given as to "questions of law only," and provision is made for
an appeal from the decision of that court to the Supreme Court upon certiorari.
It seems most reasonable to suppose that the methods which the statute provides
for determining whether an act is unfair and whether merchandise shall for that
reason be excluded are the only methods which Congress intended to employ
to enforce the statute. We realize that on the face of the statute the President is
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quently denied. 0 8 .
In 1934, the CCPA simultaneously decided two cases, In re Orion
Co. 10 9 and In re Northern Pigment Co.,110 involving Commission findings under section 337."' In both, the court passed on the constitutionality of the section, applied the substantial evidence rule to the
Commission's findings, stated that the validity of the patents involved
was not a proper consideration for the Tariff Commission or the CCPA,
and sustained the Commission's finding that the imported articles infringed the domestic patents and that their importation and sale constituted an unfair method or act. In Orion, the court refined somewhat
the statements made in the Frischercase:
[T]he Commission decided that the slide fasteners were being imported, made in conformity with the specifications and claims of
the complainant's patents, and not in conformity with the specification and claims of any United States patent owned by the respondents.
Such a finding of fact does not constitute a trial of the validity
of any of said patents or an ascertainment of infringement or
noninfringement, such as is the case when such issues arise in
equity in one of the District Courts ....

The issues of validity or

infringement are not involved, but, rather, the ascertainment of a
fact which may be the basis of a finding of unfair methods of competition or unfair acts, which thereafter may be the basis of12 an
order by the President, correcting the unfair methods or acts.
Such niceties, however, only tended to add further confusion to an
already confused situation. It was true that the Commission's findings
did not constitute legal determinations of patent validity or infringement; as has been indicated, they were not legally determinative of
anything. It was also true that the issue of patent validity was not
presented by such findings because the court had held that the Commission had neither the right nor duty to consider that issue. It was
not bound by the recommendations of the Tariff Commission or by the findings
of the Court of Customs Appeals or even by the decision of the Supreme Court
should it grant a writ of certiorari, for all are in terms advisory. But it is hardly
likely that Congress would have set up all this elaborate machinery and provided that the Court of Customs Appeals should review the Tariff Commission
only as to matters of law if a suit was to be permitted to test matters again in
a constitutional court.... In view of the broad powers of Congress to deal with
foreign importations, we think the remedy afforded was ample.
Id. at 714 (emphasis in original).
108 Frischer & Co. v. Elting, 287 U.S. 649 (1932).
109 71 F.2d 458 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
110 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
111 Oxides of Iron, Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-4 (August 16, 1933); Slide Fasteners,
Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-2 (March 20, 1933).
112 71 F.2d at 465.
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not true, however, that the issue of patent infringement was not involved. The Commission's findings, however phrased, were in essence
findings that domestic patents were being infringed.
In view of the nature of the Commission's findings, the court's
position regarding the issue of patent validity was inconsistent with
its position regarding patent infringement. If the Commission could
make a finding as to patent infringement for the purposes of section
337, why was it to be precluded from making a finding as to patent
validity? Whether such findings be denominated as findings of fact
or as conclusions of law, they both would have had the same status
under section 337. And in view of such status, it seemed completely
incongruous for the court to permit the Commission to consider the
one issue but not the other in advising the President as to the existence
of unfair methods or acts.
It should not be forgotten, in this connection, that the presumption of validity that arises from the issuance of a patent has long been
regarded as only prima facie evidence of the patent's validity; it does
not relieve the courts of their duty in an infringement suit to inquire
into such validity. 1 3 Generally, only by becoming an infringer does
one gain the opportunity to assail a patent in his own interests or that
of the public,114 and the issue of patent validity is normally an integral
part of infringement proceedings.' 5 Under these circumstances, why
should what is merely a rebuttable presumption in infringement
actions have been regarded as irrebuttable for the purposes of section
337? Once patent infringement, however characterized, had been
equated with unfair methods or acts, it should have carried with it the
issue of patent validity, and the weight given to the presumption of
validity should have been for the President to decide.
If there was ever to be CCPA restraint on the President under
section 337, it should have concerned patent infringement. Under the
guise of preventing unfair methods and acts, the President, in effect,
113 See John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529, 530-31 (8th Cir. 1964), afJ'd, 383
US. 1 (1966); Lorenz v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 305 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1962); Gomez v.
Granat Bros., 177 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 937 (1950); Davis
Harvester Co. v. Long Mfg. Co., 252 F. Supp. 989, 1008 (E.D.N.C. 1966); Sherman v.
Moore Fabrics, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 74, 80 (D.R.I. 1959). See also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.
v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154-58 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
114 United States Gypsum Co. v. Consolidated Expanded Metal Cos., 130 F.2d 888,
890 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 698 (1943).
115 It is true that a declaratory judgment may be had regarding validity, but only
if there is an actual controversy; action merely to declare a patent void does not present
such a controversy. Thermal Equip. Corp. v. Leach, 185 F. Supp. 330, 332 (E.D.N.Y.
1960); Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Dulberg, 138 F. Supp. 617, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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was prohibiting the importation of articles that allegedly infringed a
domestic patent. Because the Commission defined injury to domestic
industry in terms of patent infringement, and minimized section 337's
injury requirement, its, and ultimately the President's, determination
that a patent had been violated was the most significant determination
for purposes of section 337. Of course, original jurisdiction to determine whether patent rights have been violated is vested in the district
courts, not in the President. Congress had, however, clothed the President's actions with finality and the propriety of such actions was a
consideration only for the Congress. The President had been given full
power to determine what acts were unfair, and such power entailed
the authority to decide what factors he was to consider and what weight
he was to give to them in making his determination.
About nine months after Orion, the court wrote an opinion in
In re Amtorg Trading Corp.,11 6 which illustrated a further inconsistency to which the court had become a party in the protection of patent
rights under section 337. In Frischer, Orion, and Northern Pigment,
the CCPA made it clear that the unfair methods or acts involved were
the importation and sale of articles that violated patent rights. The
patents being infringed in the first two cases were product patents,
while the one involved in the latter case was a process patent. At the
time, the court had drawn no distinction between these patents. But
in 1935, Commission findings that a process patent was infringed and
that such infringement constituted an unfair method or act'1' were
appealed to the CCPA by an importer who contended that there was
a distinction. He maintained that the importation and sale of a product
in the United States made abroad in accordance with a domestic
patented process violated no patent rights of the patent holder and
therefore did not constitute an unfair method or act. The CCPA agreed
with the importer and overruled its decision in the Northern Pigment
case insofar as it pertained to process claims. Judge Garrett, writing for
the court, disposed of the issue as follows:
[A] process patent is not infringed by the sale of a product made
by the process, the product itself not being patented, and a product
patent is not infringed by one who uses the process by which it is
made, the process itself not being patented....
In the case at bar, the [product] is not patented. Hence there
is no infringement of the patented process by a sale of [the product].
The Russian exporter had a perfect right to sell and the American
importer had a perfect right to buy the [product] and to resell it
116 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 296 US. 576 (1935).
117 Phosphates & Apatite, Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-3 (January 15, 1934).
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in the United States, in so far as any question of a process patent
is concerned ...
Such must be the holding unless the court finds that it was the
purpose of Congress in enacting section 887 of the Tariff Act of
1930 ... to broaden the field of substantive patent rights, and create
rights in process patents extending far beyond any point to which
the courts have heretofore gone in construing the patent statutes. 118
Although the opinion of the CCPA constituted only advice to the
President, he followed the advice by not taking any action with regard
to the imports involved and by modifying the order issued in connection with the Northern Pigment case to bring it into conformity with
the court's opinion in Amtorg.119 While Congress overruled the CCPA's
Amtorg holding in 1940,120 by that time section 837 had become practically a dead letter. The Commission, following the enactment of the
Trade Agreements Act in 1984, had endeavored to avoid the inequities
that had become a part of these patent infringement proceedingswhich were virtually the only proceedings being conducted under
section 837-by withholding action until court adjudication of the
validity of the patent, and by placing greater emphasis on the injury
requirement in section 337, something that had been largely ignored
by prior Commissions. After making one affirmative determination in
1985, the Commission did not make another until 1954.
In the meantime, however, the Customs Court became involved
in section 887 actions. Under section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1980 an
importer could protest a decision of a collector of customs which excluded any merchandise from entry or delivery, and under section 515
the Customs Court had jurisdiction to pass on such protests. In 1951,
the court considered a protest concerning the exclusion of certain
cigar lighters which a collector concluded infringed a patent that was
the subject of a presidential exclusion order.' 2 ' Although issued after
a Commission investigation found that some imported lighters infringed the domestic patent while some did not, the President's order
I1s

75 F.2d at 832-34.
119 T.D. 48129, 69 TREAs. DEc. 184 (196).
120 Mhe importation hereafter for use, sale, or exchange of a product made,
produced, processed, or mined under or. by means of a process covered by the
claims of any unexpired valid United States letters patent, whether issued heretofore or hereafter, shall have the same status for the purposes of section 337
of the Tariff Act of 1930 as the importation of any product or article covered by
the claims of any unexpired valid United States letters patent.
Act of July 2, 1940, ch. 514, 54 Stat. 724, 19 U.S.C. § 1337a (1964).
121 The order (T.D. 47001, 65 TRxAS. DEc. 659 (1934)) had been issued in 1934, but
Congress had extended the life of the patent until June 1952, and the President had
accordingly extended the exclusion order to that date.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:285

was a blanket exclusion of all articles made in accordance with the
patent.122 After stating that it had jurisdiction under section 515, the
court proceeded to hold that the lighters infringed the domestic patent
and, therefore, came within the scope of the presidential order and
123
were properly excluded.
What becomes abundantly clear from the Custom Court's decision,
from which no appeal was taken to the CCPA, is that the merchandise
was excluded because the collector of customs and the Customs Court,
rather than the Tariff Commission and the President, had decided that
it infringed the domestic patent. As a result of the blanket nature of
the exclusion order, articles that were not necessarily involved in the
unfair methods or acts found to exist by the President were to be excluded, whoever the importer, if the collector decided that they infringed the domestic patent. But subsection 337(e) provided that the
President "shall direct that the articles concerned in such unfair
methods or acts, imported by any person violating the provisions of
124
this Act, shall be excluded from entry into the United States ....
In effect, the remedy prescribed by the President had exceeded the
scope of determinations properly made under section 337.125 Conse-

quently, what was to have been the President's decision became the
collector's decision, and because it was the collector's decision, the
Customs Court reviewed it. Apparently the CCPA would have reviewed
it as well if the decision of the Customs Court had been appealed.
Thus, section 337 had become a conduit through which protection
was accorded a domestic patent regardless of whether the imported
article had been the subject of an affirmative finding for the purposes
of section 337.126 By this bootstrap operation, the Customs Court had

assumed jurisdiction of what, by virtue of the President's order, had
become a patent infringement proceeding. Whereas, according to the
122 The presidential order directed the Secretary of the Treasury to exclude from
entry into the United States "cigar lighters patented in United States Letters Patent

Reissue No. 19023, except where the importation is made under license of the registered
owner of said United States Letters Patent." Id. at 660.
123 Emery, Holcombe &Blair v. United States, CD. 1318, 26 Gust. Ct. 160 (1951).
124 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337(e), 46 Stat. 704, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1964).
The quoted language is similar to that contained in § 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922 and
added on the Senate floor for the expressed purpose of limiting presidential action under
that section. 62 CONG. REC. 11241-44 (1922).
125 In reality, the President had changed the nature of the function vested in him by
the Congress. What apparently had been intended to be an adjudicatory function involving
a determination as to whether past conduct was unlawful had been converted into a rulemaking function whereby merchandise was excluded irrespective of whether the merchandise or the importer had been the subject of such a determination.
126 The President was utilizing this section to accord the same protection to designated domestic patents that was accorded domestic trademarks filed with the Secretary
of the Treasury under § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1964).
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CCPA in Orion, the issue of patent infringement was not involved
in the proceedings before the Tariff Commission and was not to be
considered in the review of its findings by the CCPA, that was the only
issue in the proceedings before the Customs Court. What had evolved
as a result of the President's action under section 337 was litigation
involving the enforcement of a patent against an infringer, even though
such enforcement rightfully constituted a case under the patent laws
of the United States, with original jurisdiction vested in the district
courts. 2 7 What should have been tried in the district courts under the

patent laws, with the domestic patent holder as a party litigant, had
become triable in the Customs Court under the customs laws with
the United States as a party litigant.
In 1955, the CCPA was again called upon to review certain findings of the Tariff Commission made under section 337. In In re Von
Clemm, 128 a majority of the Commission had found that imported
synthetic star sapphires and rubies were made in accordance with the
product and process claims of a domestic patent and that the importation had the effect or tendency to injure substantially the domestic
industry.1 29 As it did in Frischer, Orion, and Northern Pigment, the

CCPA presumed the patent to be valid, applied the substantial evidence
rule, and sustained the Commission's findings of patent infringement
130

and injury.

This case dearly indicates the deficiencies of judicial review under
section 337. As stated by the Commission in its report, all of the economic data regarding the operations of the Synthetic Crystals Division
of the domestic company had been submitted to the Commission in
confidence; 131 therefore it was not included in the record before the
court. Consequently, the court had no concrete data before it in considering whether the Commission's finding of "effect" or "tendency"
of substantial injury was supported by substantial evidence. Similarly,
the Commission did not have jurisdiction over the foreign producer,
and therefore the only evidence before it and the court of the method
used to produce the imported article was the testimony of the domestic
inventor as to how he thought the article was made. 132
127 See Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897); Lear Siegler, Inc.
v. Adkins, 350 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964).
128 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
129 Synthetic Star Sapphires & Rubies, Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-13 (September 20,

1954).
130 229 F.2d at 445.
131 Synthetic Star Sapphires & Rubies, Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-13, at 42 (September 20, 1954).
182 The importer involved in the proceedings before the Commission and the court
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Judge Cole's dissenting opinion pointed out these deficiencies in
the majority opinion and stated his reasons for concluding that Congress never intended such patent infringement proceedings to be
covered by section 337:
In effect, a patent owner, upon a showing that a product literally
described by his claims has been imported and sold in the United
States, has obtained from the Tariff Commission a recommendation
for an order that all articles which infringe his patent, or are made
by a process which infringes his patent, be excluded from the
United States.
As far as I can see from a reading of the majority opinion, there
are no circumstances under which an owner of a United States
patent could not get-without submitting to a validity contestsuch a recommendation, whenever he can show that literally infringing articles are being imported and sold. There has been no
inquiry into the validity of the patent, nor into the prior art to
limit the claims. There has been no finding of actual injury to the
patent owner; the mere fact that there have been substantial sales
has been found sufficient to establish a tendency to injure sufficient
to support an exclusion order. There has been no finding of fraud
or deceit on the part of the importer. So far as appears from this
case, all that is necessary to get an exclusion recommendation from
the Tariff Commission is (1) that there be an owner of a United
States Patent; and (2) that there be importations and sales of an
article which infringes (either by itself or by the process by which
it was made) the literal wording of the patent claims....
Carrying the majority opinion to its logical conclusion, the
only function of the Tariff Commission is to determine whether
the complaining American manufacturer has a patent. In other
words, it seems fair to conclude that section 337 has been construed
to mean that any article which infringes, or is made by a process
which infringes, the claims of a United States patent, may be barred
from importation into the United States, upon the mere application of the patent owner. While Congress undoubtedly has the
power to enact such a law, certainly, if such a meaning was intended, Congress would have said so in such clear language as the
situation deserves. It seems to me that a result such as has been
reached in this case was clearly outside the contemplation of Con133
gress in enacting the statute.
apparently was not in a position to offer other than what the Commission regarded as
"unsupported protests that a different process [was] employed abroad .... " Id. at 15.
133 229 F.2d at 445-46 (emphasis in original). Judge Cole further pointed out:
[1]t is to be seriously questioned whether, in the circumstances of this case where
no actual or impending damage has been shown, the Tariff Commission should
not have suspended its proceedings to await the outcome of the declaratory
judgment suit filed by importer (. . . now pending in the Southern District of
New York). Its action in proceeding with this rather extraordinary remedy when

the actual damage to the patent owner could be adequately recompensed in the
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The Commission was not to make another affirmative determinadon under section 337 until 1962.134 Had an appeal been taken from
these findings, it is very doubtful that the CCPA would have entertained it, for in 1958 Congress had declared the CCPA to be a constitutional court 35 and in 1962 the Supreme Court, in Glidden Co.
v. Zdanok,1386 overruled its decision on the writ of prohibition in
37
Frischer.
Subsequent to the 1958 congressional declaration that the CCPA
was a constitutional court, a retired CCPA judge had been designated
by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court to preside
over a criminal case before the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. The defendant in the case was convicted, and
the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.8 8 Certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court for the purpose of determining whether
the judgment was vitiated by the participation of the CCPA judge.
Citing the Court's decision on the writ of prohibition in Frischer,the
petitioner contended that the CCPA had not been established as a
constitutional court, that a declaration of Congress per se could not
change that status, and that, therefore, the assigning of the CCPA judge
to the district court denied petitioner the protection of judges with
tenure and compensation guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, closely divided, overruled its prior decision, holding that the CCPA had been established as a constitutional court and
declaratory judgment suit, seems extremely dubious, if not an abuse of discretion. The outcome of that case would conceivably result in complete justice to
all parties. Indeed, since in that case the entire question of validity and infringement could be litigated and disposed of, the outcome of that case would be more
likely to secure complete justice than these proceedings. If that case should be
resolved favorably to complainant here, the decision should be of inestimable
value to the Tariff Commission in the event the section 337 proceeding were
still deemed desirable.
Id. at 447. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Daly-Herring Co., 294 F. Supp. 754, 760 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
Following the decision of the CCPA in the Von Clemm case, the Commission submitted its findings and recommendations to the President. However, before any action
was taken by the President, the domestic and foreign producers reached an agreement,
which the Commission believed rendered the issue moot. It thereupon withdrew its
recommendation to the President and requested the President to return the record to it
for final disposition. Upon receipt of the record, the Commission dismissed the investigation.
184 Self-Closing Containers, Tariff Conm'n Inv. No. 337-18 (April 24, 1962).
185 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1964). The Customs Court was declared a constitutional court in
1956. Id. § 251.
186 870 US. 580 (1962).
137 See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
138 Lurk v. United States, 296 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1961), aff'd sub nom. Glidden Co.
v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 580 (1962).
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that the 1958 congressional declaration merely explained what had
been intended by the earlier act establishing the court.18 9 In so holding,
the Court considered the Article III restriction of judicial power to
"cases or controversies" and addressed itself to section 337:
The jurisdictional [statute] in issue ...
the decisions called for ...

appear[s] to subject

to an extrajudicial revisory authority

incompatible with the limitations upon judicial power this Court
has drawn from Article III ....

Whether [it] actually [does] so is

not, however, entirely free from difficulty, and cannot in our view
appropriately be decided in a vacuum, apart from the setting of
particular cases in which we may gauge the operation of the
[statute]. For disposition of the present [case], we think it is sufficient simply to note the doubt attending the validity of the jurisdiction, and to proceed on the assumption that it cannot be entertained by an Article III court.
It does not follow, however, from the invalidity, actual or
potential, of... [this] jurisdiction, that.., the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals must relinquish entitlement to recognition as
an Article III court....
.. [W]e are advised that in all the years since 1922, when the
predecessor to § 337 of the Tariff Act was first enacted, the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals has entertained only six such cases.
Certainly the status of a District Court or Court of Appeals would
not be altered by a mere congressional attempt to invest it with
such insignificant nonjudicial business; it would be equally perverse to make the status of [this court] turn upon so minuscule a
portion of [its] purported functions.
The Congress that enacted the assignment statute with its
accompanying [declaration] was. apprised of the possibility that a
re-examination of the Bakelite [decision] ... might lead to disalNevertheless it
lowance of some of [this court's] jurisdiction ....

chose to pass the statute. We think with it that, if necessary, the
140
particular offensive jurisdiction, and not the [court], would fall.

As is apparent from the foregoing, the Supreme Court did not
completely resolve the issue of whether the CCPA could entertain
jurisdiction under section 337. It left the door ajar, albeit only slightly,
for disposition of the issue when raised in connection with a section 337
proceeding, with the clear indication that the CCPA's "revisory authority" would fall when tested against Article III requirements.
During the 1960's, however, neither the CCPA nor the Supreme Court
had such an opportunity. When in November 1969 the Commission
139 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). Only three Justices concurred in the

overruling.
140 Id. at 582-83 (emphasis added) (footnote

omitted).
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made another affirmative determination under section 337,141 no appeal

was taken to the CCPA.
The confusion that has existed concerning judicial review under
section 337 has resulted from a combination of factors: the peculiar
function vested by Congress in the CCPA; an early Supreme Court
decision labeling the court as a "legislative" court; a misconception
on the part of the CCPA as to the nature of its own and of the Commission's functions under the statute; recurrent attempts to utilize the
statute to protect patent "rights"; and a 1962 decision by the Supreme
Court overruling its earlier decision and all but removing section 337
jurisdiction from the COPA.
The CCPA should never have been assigned "revisory authority"
jurisdiction under section 337. If Congress intended that there be a
judicial check on the actions of the President, it should have so provided. Instead, it provided the CCPA with statutory authority cast in
terms that sound like judicial review of on-the-record adjudicatory
proceedings, when in fact the proceedings before the Tariff Commission under section 337 are investigatory and lead to advice based on
information, a substantial portion of which is off the record. Under
such circumstances, the COPA has passed on "questions of law" by
issuing pronouncements that have had no legal force and has applied
the substantial evidence rule to, and sustained, Commission findings
supported by virtually no evidence in the record, let alone weighed in
142
accordance with the Supreme Court's rulings.
The court's pronouncements regarding the protection of patent
"rights" have added to this overall confusion. While these pronouncements have no legal force, they have been followed by the Commission
in advising the President, and the President, in turn, has often adopted
the Commission's advice in prohibiting the importation of the article
involved. The court in effect transformed patent rights, which carry
only a rebuttable presumption of validity,143 into virtually absolute
rights by holding that neither it nor the Commission had the authority
to inquire into their validity.
From the inception of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 until
November 1969, the Commission has attempted to avoid the inequities
that have become a part of section 337 patent proceedings by deferring
141 Furazolidone, Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-21 (November 13, 1969).
142 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (articulates the substantial evidence test).
143 John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir. 1964), afT'd, 383 US. 1

(1966).
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to the district courts -where a patent's validity is at the heart of the
44
issue. However, its November 1969 determination in Furazolidone,
where it refused to await the results of pending court cases involving
the validity of a patent, raises anew the problems of judicial review
under this section. Although it would appear, in the light of the Zdanok
case, that the CCPA lacks "extrajudicial revisory authority," the importer's failure to appeal the Commission's findings to the court left
this question unanswered. Moreover, to further complicate the matter,
in formulating its findings in the 1969 case, the Commission relied on
previous CCPA decisions as justification for not inquiring into the
validity of the patent and for advising the President that "patent infringement" constituted the unfair method or act. Thus, these cases
and the confusion embodied therein appear to be very much a part of
section 337 proceedings before the Commission, especially in the absence of a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court or the CCPA as to the
latter's jurisdiction.
C. Antidumping Cases
Judicial review of the administration of the Antidumping Act of
1921,145 like section 536 review, is undertaken pursuant to those provisions in the Tariff Act of 1930 that deal with appeals for reappraisement
and protests of decisions by the collector of customs regarding the
imposition of duties. Unlike section 336, however, the Antidumping
Act contains a specific provision regarding such appeals and protests:
For the purposes... of this [Act], the determination of the appraiser
or person acting as appraiser as to the foreign market value or
the constructed value, as the case may be, the purchase price, and
the exporter's sales price, and the action of the collector in assessing
special dumping duty, shall have the same force and effect and be
subject to the same right of appeal and protest, under the same
conditions and subject to the same limitations; the United
States Customs Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals shall have the same jurisdiction, powers, and dudes in connection with such appeals and protests as in the case of 1appeals
46
and protests relating to customs dudes under existing law.
As is apparent from this provision, it is the determination of the appraiser as to the value and price of the merchandise, and the action of
the collector in assessing the dumping duty, for which Congress has
144 Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. 337-21 (November 13, 1969).
145 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1964).
146 Id. § 169. Effective October 1, 1970, the words "appraiser or person acting as

appraiser" and "collector" have been replaced by "appropriate customs officer" and "such
customs officer," respectively. Also, "appeal" and "appeals" have been deleted. The

Customs Courts Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-271, § 814 (June 2,1970). See note 147 infra.
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provided judicial review.147 There is no mention of the determination
of either the Secretary of the Treasury concerning the existence of
sales at less than fair value or of the Tariff Commission concerning sales
causing or threatening injury to a domestic industry.
The procedure under the Antidumping Act leading to the imposition of a dumping duty involves first a determination by the Secretary
of the Treasury that foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be,
sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than fair value; second, a
determination by the Tariff Commission that a domestic industry is
being, or is likely to be, injured by reason of the importation of such
merchandise; third, the issuance of a finding by the Secretary consisting
of his and the Commission's determinations and a description of the
class or kind of merchandise to which the finding applies; fourth, a
determination by the appraiser regarding each importation of such
class or kind of merchandise, of the purchase price or the exporter's
sales price, and the foreign market value or constructed value; and,
finally, the assessment of a dumping duty by the collector equal to the
amount by which the latter value exceeds the former price. Since sales
at less than fair value have been defined by Treasury Department
regulations in terms of a difference between such value and price 48
the appraiser's determination is essentially the same as the Secretary's,
and the judicial review of the former in effect constitutes a review of
the latter.
The confusion that has attended judicial review of these dumping
actions has related to the procedures utilized in such actions and to the
injury determinations, now made by the Tariff Commission and prior
to 1954 by the Secretary of the Treasury. Once again this confusion
has resulted from the failure of the Customs Court and the CCPA,
especially the former, to comprehend the nature of the functions vested
by the Congress in these governmental agencies.
The doctrinal origins of judicial review in dumping cases began
simply enough. In Kleberg & Co. v. United States,14 9 the sole issue was
the validity of the Secretary's finding under the Antidumping Act; the
appraiser's value and price determinations were not in issue. The
court sustained the Secretary as follows:
147 In accordance with Reorganization Plan No. I of 1965, 3 C.F.R. 884 (1964-65

Comp.), the offices of collector of customs and appraiser of merchandise have been
abolished. The functions formerly performed by these officials under the Antidumping

Act are now performed by the district director of customs.
148 19 C.F.R. §§ 53.3-53.5 (1970) (redesignated as §§ 153.3-53.5, 85 Fed. Reg. 9251,

9271 (1970)).
149 71 F.2d 332 (C.C.P.A. 1933).
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It appears ...that the Secretary of the Treasury did make
such investigation as he thought necessary; that he did find that
an industry in the United States ...is being, or is likely to be,
injured... ; that such goods "have been sold," or are likely to be
sold, in the United States at less than their fair value.
It further appears that he made such finding public to the
extent he deemed necessary, together with a description of the
merchandise to which it applied, in such detail as was necessary
for the guidance of the appraising officers.
Thus every statutory step required by the law was taken by
the Secretary and customs officials in imposing the anti-dumping
duty here involved.
In view of the recent decisions of the United States Customs
Court, this court, and of the Supreme Court of the United States
in similar cases, it cannot now be doubted that the Congress was
within its constitutional powers in enacting this statute .... The
Congress has laid down "by legislative act an intelligible principle"
to which the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to conform, and,
therefore, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power....
It is equally well established by the authorities that if the
Secretary of the Treasury has proceeded in the method prescribed
by the Congress, we may not judicially inquire into the correctness
of his conclusions. The constitutionality of the law under which he
proceeds having been once determined, then the judicial power
extends only to a correction of his failure to proceed according to
and within the law ....
This being the state of the law, we are not at liberty here to
go into an investigation as to whether the facts shown on the trial
below justified the issuance of the order complained of. Under the
statute, the Secretary was not confined to any particular source of
information or means of investigation. Furthermore, such information as he might obtain was not open to public inspection, unless
he felt that the public interest so required. 160
The court, however, did not stop there. It addressed itself to the
question whether the Secretary exceeded his authority when he construed the words "fair value" as he had in the Treasury regulations.
Although it concluded that there was nothing "unreasonable" about
the Secretary's construction, by so doing it left the door open, as it had
under section 336, to review the judgment of the Secretary. It did not
inquire whether Congress might have intended to preclude such review
by providing in the Antidumping Act, "whenever the Secretary ....
after such investigation as he deems necessary, finds
. "15
iSo Id. at 334-35.

151 Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11. In 1954, the Act was amended
to require the Commission, instead of the Secretary, to carry on the injury investigation.
Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1213, § 301, 68 Stat. 1158, 19 US.C. § 160 (1964).
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Although the Kleberg decision indicated that the CCPA might
permit judicial examination of the judgment of the Secretary (and,
after 1954, examination of the judgment of the Tariff Commission in
injury determinations), it was not until the 1950's that these judgments
were challenged.5 2 In 1958, in Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States (an
appeal for reappraisement), 153 the Secretary's dumping finding was
contested. 154 The importer argued that the Secretary's function under
the Antidumping Act was rule making covered by section 2 of the
Administrative Procedure Act; that the Secretary had failed to publish
notice of such proposed rule making, as provided for in section 4 of
the APA; and that the Secretary had exceeded his authority under the
Antidumping Act in making his injury determination. Judge Rao, in
holding that the finding was valid, did not decide whether the Secretary's function constituted rule making. Rather, he pointed out that
even if it were, the APA's procedural requirements for rule making did
not bind the Secretary because of the Antidumping Act's specific grant
of absolute discretion in making investigations to the extent and in the
manner deemed necessary.155 As for the Secretary's determination of
injury, Judge Rao stated, citing the Bush and Kleberg cases:
In the instant case, what the court is asked to decide is whether
from facts which may or may not have been before the Secretary in
the form here presented, an erroneous principle of law was adopted,
without any affirmative showing of what that principle was ....

It

is not the province of the court to substitute its discretion for that
of the Secretary of the Treasury or to analyze the facts in the light
of ephemeral construction....
...

Since the Secretary is the sole judge of the existence of the

facts necessary to support his findings, and his finding has been
152 There was a fair amount of litigation under the Antidumping Act during the
intervening years, but it involved a challenge to the appraiser's value and price determinations rather than to the Secretary's findings. As to such determinations by the
appraiser, there was little question about the scope of judicial review, since Congress in
effect had provided for a trial de novo. See United States v. European Trading Co., 27
C.C.P.A. (Customs) 289 (1940); Kreutz & Co. v. United States, 25 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 180
(1937); United States v. Kleberg & Co., 25 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 142 (1937); United States
v. C.J. Tower & Sons, 24 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 456 (1937); United States v. Manahan Chem.
Co., 24 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 53 (1936). See also CJ. Tower & Sons v. United States, 71 F.2d
438 (C.C.P.A. 1934), where the court held that dumping duties were additional duties and
not penalties. With regard to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court and CCPA,
see North Am. Cement Corp. v. Anderson, 284 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Cottman Co. v.
Dailey, 94 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1938); Kreutz v. Durning, 69 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1934); Horton
v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C.), afj'd, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).
153 Reap. Dec. 9212, 41 Cust. Ct. 519 (1958), rev'd, 178 F. Supp. 922 (Cust. Ct. 1959),
rev'd, 296 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
154 The finding had been made prior to the 1954 transfer of injury determinations
to the Tariff Commission.
155 41 Cust. Ct. at 526-27.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:285

made in the language of the applicable statute, his act may not be
judicially characterized as ultra vires.156
An appeal was taken to the Third Division, Appellate Term, of
the Customs Court, which reversed Judge Rao's decision. 157 The court
held that the Secretary's action under the Antidumping Act constituted
rule making; 15s that Congress intended the APA to apply to the Secretary's function under the Antidumping Act; that the Secretary did not
comply with section 4 of the APA; and that, in accordance with section 10 of the APA, his finding was invalid. In view of this holding,
the court regarded as unnecessary a consideration of the question raised
by the Secretary's determination of injury.
A further appeal was taken to the CCPA, which in turn reversed
the judgment of the Third Division.'6 9 The court held that the
importer had actual notice of the pendency of the Secretary's investigation, had participated actively and without objection in the investigation, and had thereby waived his right to rely upon the asserted procedural irregularity. It therefore found it unnecessary to pass upon the
applicability of the APA to an antidumping investigation or upon
whether a finding of dumping constituted rule making as defined in
the APA. As to the Secretary's injury determination, it cited the
Kleberg holding that the court was not at liberty to investigate whether
the facts shown justified the issuance of the order. 16 0
In a 1959 case, Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States,' 61 another
challenge was made to a dumping finding by the Secretary. As one
ground for appeal, the importer contended that the Secretary's finding

was invalid because it was predicated on a Commission determination
that did not satisfy the statutory requirements; i.e., the Commission,

for the purpose of making its determination that "an industry in the
United States"'16 2 was injured, had regarded the domestic industry as
consisting only of the producers of cast iron soil pipe in California.
156 Id. at 530-31.

157 Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 922 (Cust. Ct. 1959).
168 Mhe Secretary's finding implements the law laid down by Congress; it is

part of the legislative process; it applies to all such merchandise which has not
been appraised; it changes existing conditions by a new rule that hardboard from
Sweden shall be appraised under the Antidumping Act; it is directed toward a
general situation and not toward particular persons; it governs all importers of
such merchandise, present and future, whether or not they had knowledge of
the investigation.
Id. at 928.
159 United States v. Elof Hansson, Inc., 296 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
160 Id. at 782-83.
161 Reap. Dec. 9544, 43 Cust. Ct. 548 (1959), aff'd, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961),
aff'd, 50 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 36 (1963).
162 Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160(a)

(1964).
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Judge Lawrence of the Customs Court, in upholding the Commission's determination and the Secretary's finding, deemed the Kleberg
and Bush cases dispositive of the controversy.1 3 An appeal was taken
again to the Third Division, which held that although the Commission's determinations were not subject to judicial review as to discretionary findings, they were subject to review on the question of compliance with the terms of the authority delegated by the Congress.'6
The court then affirmed the Customs Court, citing legislative support
for the Commission's application of the term "industry." The case
was further appealed to the CCPA, which agreed with the Third
Division's analysis of the legislative history and with the conclusions drawn therefrom, but found it unnecessary to base its decision
thereon. 6 5 It stated that it considered the Commission's determination
of injury, or likelihood of injury, to be national in scope, despite the
Commission's specific limitation to producers in California; 6 6 and
concluded, in utter disregard of the principle announced in SEC v.
Chenery Corp.:167
In view of the established doctrine of the Kleberg and Bush cases giving
finality to the acts of public officers who have been endowed by Congress with
discretionary powers, the court has disregarded portions of the record other than
those deemed necessary to determine whether the jurisdictional requirements of
the Antidumping Act, as amended, have been complied with. In other words, the
court has not, in the exercise of its judicial function, inquired into the mental
operations or the correctness of the conclusions arrived at by the Commission.
163

The statement of the Tariff Commission in its report to the Secretary of the
Treasury that "The domestic industry to which the Commission's determination
of injury relates was held to consist of the producers of cast iron soil pipe in
the State of California" is not a matter for judicial injury. The reason for selecting the California producers was the sole concern of the Commission.
43 Gust. Ct. at 552-53.
164 Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961).
165 Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 50 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 86 (1963).
166 We think it clear that the Tariff Commission considered the nationwide effect
its determination would have. The Commission had evidence before it (a) that
the market area of the California producers includes "The seven Western states,"
and (b) that in several of these states competition existed from U.S. producers
of cast iron pipe from states other than California. Such producers would obviously
also be affected by the dumping of British cast iron soil pipe on the West Coast.
Accordingly, we do not think that the Commission intended to limit itself to
the State of California when it determined broadly, essentially in the words of
the statute, that "a domestic industry in the United States is being, or is likely
to be, injured." We consider this determination to be the basic determination
of the Commission. We cannot agree with appellant that there is anything in
the Commission's further statement referring to the California producers of
cast iron soil pipe that would indicate that the Commission intended to limit
geographically its actual determination that "a domestic industry in the United
States is being, or is likely to be, injured."
Id. at 42 (emphasis in original).
167 818 US. 80 (1948) (the validity of an administrative determination must be judged
on the grounds upon which the record discloses the action was taken).
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Had the Tariff Commission omitted its gratuitous definition
of "The domestic industry to which the Commission's determination of injury relates" and merely stated its determination in the
words of the statute, we think it unlikely that this appeal would
ever have been taken. It seems to us it is only because of the specific

language used by the Commission in stating the basis for its determination, that the problems of the instant case have arisen.168

In a more recent case, City Lumber Co. v. United States,169 an
importer contended that the Commission had exceeded its statutory
authority in applying the statutory term "is being injured" to the
continuance of an existing injury. In upholding the Commission's
determination, Judge Wilson, notwithstanding his reference to the
holding in the Kleberg case that the court was not at liberty to investigate whether the facts shown justified the issuance of a dumping order,
held that the Commission properly applied the statute and that its
determination was supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, his
decision was affirmed by the First Division, Appellate Term, of the
170
Customs Court.
Litigation under the Antidumping Act concerning the determinations of the Secretary of the Treasury and of the Tariff Commission has
had little effect on the administration of the Act. No finding of the
Secretary predicated on a Commission determination has been declared
invalid, and both the Treasury Department and the Commission continue to regard their proceedings as not involving "rule making." The
courts, however, especially the Customs Court, have been laboring
under misconceptions as to the nature of the functions of the Secretary
and the Commission. The Third Division of the Customs Court continues to regard these functions as rule making; 171 the First Division
of the Customs Court has undertaken to determine whether the Commission's determination was supported by "substantial evidence"; and
the CCPA has gone behind the Commission's determination and substituted its judgment for that of the Commission.
While it might appear at first blush that the Bush case should have
been dispositive of the latter two issues, there is a distinction between
the nature of the function performed by the President under section
386 and the nature of the functions performed by the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Commission under the Antidumping Act. Under
section 336, deciding whether to effectuate the duties recommended by
168 50 C.C.P.A. (Customs) at 42 (emphasis in original).
169 290 F. Supp. 385 (Cust. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 311 F. Supp. 340 (Cust. Ct. 1970).
170 City Lumber Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 340 (Cust. Ct. 1970).
171 Hoenig Plywood Corp. v. United States, Reap. Dec. 10569, 51 Cust. Ct. 336 (1963).
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the Commission has been committed to the President's discretion;
under the Antidumping Act, while the determinations of the Secretary
and the Commission entail the exercise of some discretion, if these
determinations are affirmative, the imposition of a dumping duty becomes mandatory with respect to certain merchandise. Section 336 is,
so to speak, a "permissive" statute, while the Antidumping Act is
"mandatory." While the courts have ruled out judicial review with
respect to the exercise of discretion under the former type,172 there
has been an increasing tendency on their part to regard decisions under
3
the latter type of statute as subject to review."
The Customs Court's and the CCPA's practice of engaging in
judicial review with respect to the determinations of the Secretary and
the Commission under the Antidumping Act is thus in accordance with
the growing body of opinion that subjects action under "mandatory"
statutes to review. But engaging in judicial review is one thing; the
scope of such review is another. And it is with respect to the latter that
the pronouncements of these courts have tended to become confusing.
In the Hansson case, the Third Division's characterization of the
proceedings under the Antidumping Act as rule making and the consequent review by the court of the procedures followed by the Secretary
in the making of his finding did violence both to the definitions of the
terms "rule" and "rule making" in the APA, and to the provisions of
the Antidumping Act. These proceedings are not designed to formulate
174
a "statement of general or particular applicability and future effect";
they are designed to make essentially factual determinations that lead
175 If
to the imposition of dumping duties prescribed by the statute.
172 In addition to Bush, see Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309
(1958); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); 4 K. DAvis,
supra note 8, at § 28.16.
173 See United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414 (1931); Ferry v. Udall,
336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964); 4 K. DAvis, supra note 8, at § 28.16. See also Sugarman v.
Forbragd, 405 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1968), where the court of appeals held that, within the
meaning of the APA, exclusion from importation was "committed" to the discretion of the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, but regarded the question of arbitrary action
as an appropriate subject for judicial review. It would appear that if the court regarded
the statute involved (21 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1964)) as a "permissive" statute, then it should
not have regarded the Secretary's action as reviewable for arbitrariness or abuse of
discretion. If, on the other hand, it regarded the statute as "mandatory," then it should
have regarded the Secretary's action as involving discretion rather than as having been
committed to his discretion. But see Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial
Review, 65 COLum. L. REv. 55 (1965).

174 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)-(5) (Supp. V, 1970).
175 Surprisingly enough, the court itself referred to the proceedings in these terms
in its opinion, when it stated that "the Secretary, under the Antidumping Act, finds facts
which bring into operation certain consequences provided for by the statute." 178 F. Supp.
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the Customs Court's Third Division felt compelled to affix a label to
these proceedings for APA purposes, it should have denominated them
adjudicatory rather than rule making in character. 1 6 As the Third
Division itself recognized, the finding brought into operation "certain
consequences" provided for by the statute, and it represented the application of a statute to past events, which of course is essentially a
judicial-type determination.
Had the court properly characterized these proceedings as adjudicatory, the procedures followed by the Secretary would have conformed not only with the provisions of the Antidumping Act but also
with those of the APA. For the procedural requirements of sections 5
and 7 of the APA, regarding adjudicatory proceedings, are applicable
only to adjudication required by statute "to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 177 And, as stated in
the Attorney General's Manual on the APA, "[m]ere statutory authorization to hold hearings (e.g., 'such hearings as may be deemed neces17 8
sary') does not constitute such a requirement."
In the Orlowitz case, the scope of review was extended to the Commission's application of the statute, but the courts failed to consider the
Commission's reasons or all of the information upon which the Commission based its determination. The absence of a statutory requirement for a statement of reasons 79 and the CCPA holding in the 1933
Kleberg case that the court was not at liberty to investigate whether
the facts justified the administrative determination no doubt supported
Judge Lawrence in his holding that the Commission statement was not
a matter for judicial inquiry.8 0 On appeal, however, the Third Diviat 927. It nonetheless regarded such factual determinations-which Congress had provided
were to be made after such investigation as the Secretary "deems necessary"--to be rule
making, and held the Secretary's finding to be invalid, under the APA, because it was
"without observance of procedures required by law." Id. at 929-30.
176 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)-(7) (Supp. V, 1970).
177 Id. § 554(a).
178 ATORNEY GENERAL's MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDuRE Aar 41 (1947).
179 The requirement in the Antidumping Act that the Secretary and the Commission

publish their determinations in the Federal Register with a statement of the reasons
therefor was not added until 1958 (19 U.S.C. § 160 (1964)), and therefore was not in
effect at the time that the determinations involved in Orlowitz were made. Consequently,
the Commission's report to the Secretary, which also was made public, consisted of four
small paragraphs. After reciting its determination in statutory language, the Commission
stated, with no further comment: "The domestic industry to which the Commission's
determination of injury relates was held to consist of the producers of cast iron soil pipe
in the State of California ...." Cast Iron Soil Pipe from the United Kingdom, Tariff
Comm'n Inv. No. AA1921-5, at 1-2 (October 26, 1955).
180 Without an examination of the facts before the Commission, he might wel not
have been in a position to assess the legal significance of the Commission's statement.
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sion treated the Commission's statement as solely one of statutory
interpretation, and without inquiry into the facts involved held that
the Commission had acted in accordance with the authority delegated
to it.""' But even though the Third Division limited itself to statutory
interpretation in the abstract, the CCPA expanded the scope of judicial
review by inquiring into the facts, and, finally, by substituting its judgment for that of the Commission. All that remained to be applied under
this expanded scope of judicial review was the "substantial evidence"
rule, and this was applied by Judge Wilson and the Appellate Term
of the First Division of the Customs Court in the City Lumber case.
After repeated quotations from the Commission's report, the testimony
before the Commission, and briefs submitted to the Commission, Judge
Wilson found that "[a]n examination of the voluminous record disdoses substantial evidence in support of the facts set forth in the
81 2
majority statement [of the Commission]."'
While there is little question that Customs Court and CCPA review of the determinations of the Secretary and the Commission exceeds the limits of the APA and the Antidumping Act, this does not
mean that there should be no judicial review. As indicated, the Antidumping Act is a mandatory-type statute; the imposition of dumping
duties has not been left to the unbridled discretion of the Executive.
Now that publication of a statement of reasons has been made a statutory requirement for both the Secretary and the Commission, 8 3 the
Customs Court and the CCPA, possessing exclusive jurisdiction in
Even if he had attempted to inquire into the facts involved before the Commission to
determine if the statute had been properly applied by it, he would have had to have
based his judgment on only a portion of such information. Although a public hearing
had been held in connection with the Commission's investigation and a transcript had
been made available to the public, the Commission had not been limited to making its
determination on the basis of such hearing. Moreover, under the statute the Commission
was not even required to hold a public hearing; if no public hearing in fact had been
held, the only way Judge Lawrence could possibly have determined whether the Commission had properly applied the statute would have been by conducting a trial de novo on
both the facts and law, which unquestionably would have been beyond the scope of the
court's jurisdiction.
181 While it was to become quite dear from later Commission action that it was
applying a "geographical segmentation" principle in making its injury determinations, its
quoted statement (note 179 supra), standing by itself, was not necessarily "interpretive"
of the statute; it was cryptic enough to have permitted the court to conclude (which it
did not), without inquiry into the facts, that it was unclear whether the Commission
had acted within its delegated authority and to remand for clarification, in accordance
with the Chenery doctrine.
182 City Lumber Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 385, 890 (Cust. Ct. 1968), aff1'd,
311 F. Supp. 340 (Cust. Ct. 1970).
183 See note 179 supra.
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customs matters, have a legitimate judicial function to perform in
this area. The scope of judicial review of these administrative determinations should be limited, however, to a consideration of whether,
in the light of the reasons adduced, they have a rational basis in law. 8 4
This is, in effect, the holding of the Kleberg case and it is also the scope
of review provided for in the APA with respect to proceedings of this
nature.18 5 Since these proceedings are not adjudications "on the record,"
the substantial evidence rule is not appropriate in appraising their findings. A more limited scope of review would tend to avoid the substitution by these courts of their judgment for that of the Secretary and the
Commission. If on the basis of the published reasons these courts were
to conclude that there is no rational basis in law for the determinations
made, or that such reasons are not adequate for them to ascertain
whether there is such a basis, then they should set aside the value and
price determinations of the appraiser and remand the case for furthei
administrative proceedings. These proceedings would be for the pur.
pose of making a new injury or sales at less than fair value determination, or for the purpose of making a more detailed or intelligible statement of reasons. 186
There is one drawback in applying even such a limited scope of
review to the determinations constituting a dumping finding: the
existing procedures for judicial review are inefficient. The Orlowitz
case, for example, was decided by the CCPA almost eight years after
the Commission had made its injury determination and the Secretary
had issued his dumping finding. Obviously, what is required if such
judicial review is to be efficient is a statutory amendment permitting,
within a specified time period, a direct appeal from a finding of the
Secretary to the CCPA. This would be analogous to the procedures
under which appeals are taken to the courts of appeals from determinations made by other administrative agencies.' 87
184 See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 US. 357 (1965); NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); 4 K. DAvis, supra note 8, at §§ 30.01-.14.
185 In the language of the APA, the test would be whether, on the basis of the
reasons given, the determinations of -the Secretary and the Commission are "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 US.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1970).
186 See FPC v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 893 U.S. 71 (1968); Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962); 2 K. DAvis, supra note 8, at § 16.12.
187 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1964), under which the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications
Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, and the Federal Trade Commission.
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D. Escape Clause and Section 22 Cases
As under sections 336 and 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, so under
the escape-clause provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and
the provisions of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,
the Tariff Commission functions in an advisory capacity, and the
actions of the President are discretionary. Hence, the holding in the
Bush case-that review by the Customs Court and CCPA does not
permit judicial examination of the judgment of the President, or for
that matter the advice of the Commission-would appear to be equally
applicable to his actions and its advice under these provisions. Surprisingly enough, considering the difficulties experienced under judicial
review of section 336 and 337 cases, there has been general recognition
of this principle by these courts. Nevertheless, the courts have in
effect substituted their judgment for that of the President in the two
leading cases involving presidential actions under the escape clause
and section 22 provisions.
1. Escape Clause
s
By the 1934 addition of section 350 to the Tariff Act of 1930, 18
the President was authorized from 1934 to the enactment of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 to enter into trade agreements, to proclaim such
modifications in import duties and other import restrictions as required
or appropriate to carry out such agreements, and to terminate at any
time, in whole or in part, any such proclamation. Practically the only
limitations on this authority were the rate limitations specified in
section 350.
Pursuant to this authority, the President in 1947 entered into the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),18 9 which included
a list of concessions and related provisions, and he then proclaimed
such duty modifications as were specified or provided for in the agreement.190 Among the modifications proclaimed were decreases in the
rates of duty on bicycles. As specified in the proclamation, these duty
modifications involved more than just decreases in the rates of duty;
they involved decreases subject to the applicable terms, conditions, and
qualifications set forth in the schedule of concessions and parts I, II,
and III of the GATT.
Among the conditions or reservations contained in part II of the
GATT were the so-called escape-clause provisions of article XIX, which
188 Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943.
189 Oct. 13, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 (1950).

190 Pres. Proc. No. 2761A, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1943-48 Comp.).
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permitted, under certain circumstances, a party to the agreement to suspend a concession in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify it.
Prior to the enactment of section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951,191 the domestic procedures leading to the invocation of this
reservation were established by executive order. 192
By the enactment of section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951, these domestic procedures became statutory. Section 7
provided, as had the executive orders, for a Tariff Commission investigation and report to the President. The Commission-upon presidential request, congressional resolution, its own motion, or application
of an interested party-was to determine whether a product was, as
a result of the duty reflecting a concession, being imported in such
increased quantities as to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry producing a-like or directly competitive product. If the
Commission found in the affirmative, it was to recommend to the
President the withdrawal or modification of the concession, its suspension in whole or in part, or the establishment of import quotas, to the
extent and for the time necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.
Section 7 also provided:
Upon receipt of the Tariff Commission's report .

. .

. the

President may make such adjustments in the rates of duty, impose
such quotas, or make such other modifications as are found and
reported by the Commission to be necessary ....

If the President

does not take such action within sixty days he shall immediately
submit a report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
and to the Committee on Finance of the Senate stating why he
has not made such adjustments or modifications, or imposed such
quotas.' 93

In 1955, the Commission, pursuant to the escape-clause procedures contained in section 7, made an affirmative determination with
respect to bicycles and recommended to the President certain increases
in the rates of duty. After asking for additional information from the
Commission, the President proclaimed the recommended increases,
except in the case of certain lightweight bicycles. 94 For such bicycles,
191 Act of June 16, 1951, ch. 141, § 7, 65 Stat. 74.
192 Exec. Order No. 10082, 3 C.F.R. 281 (1949-53 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 10004,
3 C.F.R. 819 (1943-48 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 9832, 3 C.F.R. 624 (1943-48 Comp.). In one
instance, following the utilization of these procedures, the President did invoke this
reservation in withdrawing the concession that had been granted for certain women's fur
felt hats and hat bodies, and in terminating the reduced rate that had been proclaimed
for such articles. Pres. Proc. No. 2912, 3 C.F.R. 96 (1949-53 Comp.).
198 Act of June 16, 1951, ch. 141, § 7(c), 65 Stat. 74.
194 Pres. Proc. No. 3108, 3 C.F.R. 54 (1954-58 Comp.).
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he proclaimed a smaller increase than that recommended by the Commission.
In proclaiming these increases, the President stated that he was
acting not only under the authority of section 350 but also under the
authority of section 7. But section 7 appeared to grant him no more
authority than he already had under section 350. In addition, it contained certain language, which if taken out of context, could have
been construed as limiting his proclaiming authority.
Pursuant to section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, an importer of
lightweight bicycles challenged the legality of the proclamation in
Schmidt Pritchard& Co. v. United States.195 He argued, among other
things, that the proclamation was invalid because the President had
proclaimed a rate of duty that had not been found and recommended
by the Commission, and that the statute required the President to
either accept or reject the findings and recommendations of the Commission. The Customs Court sustained this contention, with Judge
Lawrence writing the opinion. After citing a number of statutory provisions, including section 350, in which Congress had endowed the
President with authority to exercise independent judgment in modifying the tariff schedules, Judge Lawrence pointed to the language in
section 7 and concluded that it "directs the President to make the
adjustments or modifications found and reported by the Tariff Commission, or to reject them."'196
But section 7 contained no such statutory mandate; it was by its
terms purely permissive. The section's only requirement was that the
President report to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees if he did not take the recommended action within sixty
days. 1 97 There was no requirement that he take that action or no action; the statute merely said he "may" make such adjustments "as are
found and reported by the Commission to be necessary." Since the
language used in section 7 was permissive, it could hardly have constituted a limitation on the President's authority under section 350
to proclaim such modifications of existing duties as were required or
appropriate to carry out foreign trade agreements. Furthermore, if
the court regarded section 7 as containing proclaiming authority that
195 167 F. Supp. 272 (Gust. Ct. 1958), af'd in part, 47 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 152, cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 919 (1960).
196 Id. at 282 (emphasis in original).
197 Section 7 did contain a number of mandates respecting Commission investigations,
one of which became the subject of litigation. See Talbot v. Atlantic Steel Co., 275 F.2d
4 (D.C. Cir. 1960), where the court of appeals held that the Commission was required by
§ 7 to institute an investigation upon proper application of an interested party.
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was independent of the President's authority under section 350 (and
it is not clear from its opinion that it did), then the rate limitations
contained in the latter section were apparently not applicable to his
actions under the former. Considering the procedural nature of section 7, it was hardly likely that this was the intention of the Congress,
especially in view of the absence of any language indicating unlimited
delegation of power to the President. Conversely, if the court regarded
section 7 as containing independent proclaiming authority subject to
the rate limitations contained in section 350, by what process did this
transference take place? What becomes clear is that by lifting the language in section 7 out of the trade agreements context of which it was
a part, the court succeeded in construing as mandatory what was meant
to be permissive.
An appeal was taken from the Customs Court's decision to the
CCPA, but it supported the lower court's position. In reaching this
result, it stated:
Counsel for appellant argued that a restrictive construction of
the statute which allows the President only the alternative of proclaiming the modifications recommended or of disregarding the
recommendations limits the powers of the [P]resident and that this
cannot be done by a procedural statute. This argument ignores the
fact that section 7 establishes a particular proceeding for a particular purpose and does not affect any powers granted under other
applicable statutes.198
The court thereby contradicted itself. For if section 7 did not affect
the President's power under section 350 and if escape-clause modifications could continue to be proclaimed under the authority of section
350, then a presidential proclamation valid under section 350 should
not have been declared invalid merely because it might not have been
authorized by section 7. The proclaimed rates, being within the rate
limitations contained in section 350, were validly proclaimed under
that section.
Although the CCPA agreed with the Customs Court on the question of what rates the President could proclaim pursuant to the escapeclause procedures, its holding in the case was narrower than that of
the Customs Court. While the Customs Court had held the entire
proclamation to be invalid, the CCPA held invalid only that portion
proclaiming a rate other than that recommended by the Commission;
198 United States v. Schmidt Pritchard & Co., 47 C.C.PA. (Customs) 152, 160 n.4
(1960) (emphasis added).
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that is, the rate for lightweight bicycles.1 9 In so doing, the court substituted its judgment for that of the President and of the Commission.
Both the President and the Commission had found that, in order to
remedy serious injury to the domestic industry, rate increases were
necessary for all the bicycles covered by the Commission's investigation. By invalidating altogether the increase in the rate for lightweight
bicycles, the court left standing a finding that was neither the President's nor the Commission's.
Within seven months of the CCPA's decision, the President restored, pursuant to section 350, the escape-clause rate that he had proclaimed for lightweight bicycles 2 0 0 This time he invoked article
XXVIII of the GATT,20 1 under which a contracting party could, by
negotiation and agreement, modify or withdraw a concession that it
had granted. He need not have waited that long to impose a higher
rate; he had the authority under section 350 not only to proclaim
such duty modifications as were required or appropriate to carry out
foreign trade agreements, but also to terminate at any time, in whole
or in part, any proclamation that had been issued. 20 2 In view of this
broad delegation by the Congress of tariff-making authority to the
President, the manner in which section 7 was construed and applied
by the Customs Court and the CCPA was completely at odds with the
trade agreements program of which it was a part.
This confusion in the operation of the trade agreements program
has since been removed. In drafting the escape-clause provisions of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which replaced those of section 7, Congress specified in no uncertain terms that it was the President in whom
the power was vested to determine what rate of duty should be applied:
After receiving an affirmative finding of the Tariff Commission
...

with respect to an industry, the President may proclaim such

increase in, or imposition of, any duty or other import restriction
199 Id. at 163. The proclamation's severability later became a specific issue in
Thornley v. United States, CD. 3133, 59 Cust. Ct. 261 (1967), and the Customs Court held
that the proclamation was severable.
200 Pres. Proc. No. 3394, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1959-63 Comp.). The validity of this proclamation has also been challenged. Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. United States, Protest No.
64/6295 (Cust. Ct. 1964).
201 Oct. 13, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A 71, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 67, 55 U.N.T.S. 188,

252 (1950).
202 In this connection see Falcon Sales Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 97 (Cust.
Ct. 1961), where the Customs Court, invalidating another presidential proclamation upon
the Schmidt rationale, also held that the President did not act under his "terminating"
authority by "suspending" an earlier proclamation.
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on the article causing or threatening to cause serious injury to such
necessary to prevent or remedy
industry as he determines to be
03
2
serious injury to such industry.

2. Section 22
Under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act,20 4 the
procedure leading to the imposition of additional import restrictions involves: (1) the Secretary of Agriculture advising the President that he has reason to believe that articles are being or are
practically certain to be imported under such conditions and in such
quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, a program or operation undertaken by the Department
of Agriculture with respect to an agricultural commodity; (2) a determination by the President as to whether there is reason for such belief;
(3) when the President so directs, an investigation by the Tariff Commission for the purpose of determining such facts; and (4) when on
the basis of such Commission investigation and report of its findings
and recommendations the President finds the existence of such facts,
the issuance of a proclamation by him imposing such import fees or
such quantitative restrictions as he finds and declares to have been
shown by such investigation to be necessary. No fee, however, can be
imposed in excess of fifty percent ad valorem, and no quantitative
restriction can be imposed which would reduce the total quantity of
imports of the article involved to proportionately less than fifty percent of the total quantity that entered during a representative period
determined by the President.
Any such proclamation may, after investigation and report by
the Commission, be suspended, terminated, or modified by the President whenever he finds and proclaims that changed circumstances so
require; and any decision of the President as to the facts under section

22 is to be final. In any case where the Secretary of Agriculture determines and reports to the President that a condition exists which requires emergency treatment, the President may take immediate action
under section 22 without awaiting the Commission's recommendations.
Such action is to continue in effect pending the report and recommendations of the Commission and action thereon by the President. Fees
imposed under section 22 are to be treated for administrative purposes
as duties imposed by the Tariff Act of 1930, but are not to be considered as duties for the purpose of granting preferential concessions
under any international obligation of the United States. In addition,
203 19 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1) (1964) (emphasis added).
204

7 U.S.C. § 624 (1964).
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no trade agreement or other international agreement is to be applied
in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of the section.
Pursuant to these provisions, the President, in 1953, imposed on
the importation of peanuts an absolute quota of 1,709,000 pounds for
the twelve-month period beginning July 1, 1953, and for each such
period thereafter. 205 In March 1955, following an investigation by the
Commission and after the quota for the period beginning July 1, 1954,
had been filled, the President, because of a drought-induced reduction
in the domestic peanut crop, modified his earlier proclamation to permit the importation of an additional quantity of not more than
51,000,000 pounds of peanuts during the remainder of that quota
year.2 06 Such additional imports, however, were made subject to a fee
of up to two cents per pound, but not to exceed fifty percent ad
valorem, as recommended by the Commission.
An importer of peanuts that entered within the enlarged quota
challenged the President's authority to impose the fee in Best Foods,
2 °7 He argued that while the President had the
Inc. v. United States.
power either to fix a quota or to exact a fee, he did not have the power
to do both, and that, therefore, the President's 1955 proclamation was
void insofar as it imposed a fee. The Customs Court agreed and held
the fee to be invalid. After first acknowledging that it did not have
jurisdiction "to review either the President's findings of fact, or his
discretion, or the proceedings of the Tariff Commission," the court
decided that the President's action did not constitute a "modification"
for purposes of section 22:
So far as the peanut quota is concerned, the action proclaimed
clearly fits the dictionary and judicially contrived meanings of
modification. The previous limitation on imported peanuts was
altered somewhat. It was eased. That is a modification.
A fee was also imposed. This is a new burden. Was this a
modification of the previous peanut quota proclamation, within the
intent of Congress in delegating to the President power to modify
his previous proclamation? Nothing in the record persuades us that
208
it is.

205 Pres. Proc. No. 3019, 3 C.F.R. 189 (1949-53 Comp.).
206 Pres. Proc. No. 3084, 3 C.F.R. 33 (1954-58 Comp.).
207 158 F. Supp. 583 (Cust. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 47 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 163 (1960).
208 Id. at 590 (emphasis in original). A rehearing was granted by the court (Abs. 62865,
42 Cust. Ct. 310 (1958)), and it entered the same judgment that it had previously entered,
with Judge Richardson, who had not participated in the earlier proceedings, dissenting. He
regarded the court's application of the term "modify" as unduly restrictive. He further
stated:
It is evident . . . that the fee provision is an integral part of the scheme

permitting entry of additional peanuts. The President found that the entry of
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On appeal, the CCPA affirmed.20 9 Its rationale, however, was different from the lower court's. It stated that it was not necessary to
decide whether the President's action constituted a "modification,"
since under section 22 he did not have authority to proclaim both a
fee and a quota with respect to one commodity. It pointed to the use
of the disjunctive "or" in the statute and to statements in both the
House and Senate committee reports made in connection with the
1940 legislation that amended section 22 to give the President the
authority to impose fees, 210 and concluded that when Congress used
the term "or" in this statute it meant "or" literally, not "and."
The opinion of the Customs Court was based on an excessively
narrow interpretation of the word "modification," and that of the
CCPA on an excessively strict interpretation of the language used by
the Congress in granting additional authority to the President so that
he would have a greater degree of flexibility under the statute. Instead
of regarding the use of the word "or" as constituting a limitation on
the President's discretion, the CCPA should have regarded it as reflecting congressional intent to obviate confusion as to the range of presidential discretion. 21 1 For if "and" instead of "or" had been used by
the Congress, then it might have appeared that it had intended to limit
the President's discretion to imposing both a quota and a fee.2 12 Within
additional peanuts subject to such fee would not render ineffective or interfere
with the peanut program of the Department of Agriculture. The President's judgment in this regard may not be judicially reviewed. United States v. George S.
Bush & Co., Inc. . .. The court cannot assume that the President would have
found that entry of additional peanuts, without payment of a fee, would have
had no injurious effect on the peanut program. It follows that if the fee provision is stricken from the proclamation, the intent of the President to permit the
entry of the additional quantity of peanuts only subject to a fee, is rendered
ineffective.
.. The fee provision may not be deleted from the proclamation as a severable
part thereof, and if, as plaintiff contends, the fee provision is invalid, the quantitative provision must fall with it, and plaintiff's case would be destroyed.
Id. at 320-21.
209 United States v. Best Foods, Inc., 47 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 163 (1960).
210 Act of Jan. 25, 1940, ch. 13, 54 Stat. 17. Both the House and Senate reports contained the following statement:
mhe bill amends section 22 so as to permit the President, upon the recommendation of the United States Tariff Commission, to impose either an importation fee or an importation quota, whichever under the circumstances is determined to be better adapted for the protection of any particular farm program.
H.R. R P. No. 1166, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1939); S.REP. No. 1043, 76th Cong., Ist Sess.
2 (1939).
211 See Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 392-93 (1902).
212 Section 22, as amended in 1940, provided that the President "shall by proclamation impose such fees on, or such limitations on the total quantities of, any article or
articles which may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption as he finds
and declares shown by such investigation to be necessary .... " Act of Aug. 24, 1935,
ch. 641, § 22(b), 49 Stat. 774, as amended, Act of Jan. 25, 1940, ch. 13, 54 Stat. 17.
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the statutory context, the word "or" conveyed an intention to grant
a greater range of discretion; in the absence of language to the contrary, it should not have been construed to preclude the combined
utilization of a quota and a fee. The language in the House and Senate
reports on the 1940 amendment did not warrant a conclusion that
Congress intended otherwise. Moreover, in this field of trade regulation, when Congress has intended to limit the President to a choice
of mutually-exclusive remedies, it has specifically so provided in the
statute. For example, section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides
that no rate of duty may be increased by the President if he changes
218
the basis of valuation.
Regardless of the substantive merits of the courts' interpretations
of the words "or" and "modification," the manner in which they disposed of the case ignored the discretion vested by Congress in the
President. By declaring the fee invalid, with nothing more, both courts
in effect substituted their judgment concerning the appropriate remedy
under section 22 for that of the President. The President had found
that both an increase in the quota and the imposition of a fee were
necessary to carry out the purposes of the statute. By invalidating the
fee, but not the quota increase, they left standing a partial remedy
that was not the President's. Having once determined that the President
had exceeded his authority, the courts should have declared both to
be invalid. The case could then have been remanded by the CCPA
to the Customs Court with instructions to hold it until the issuance
of a valid proclamation by the President.2 14 To be sure, such a disposition would have entailed retroactive rule making by the President,
but there is judicial precedent for such retroactivity,21 5 and it would
have constituted a lesser evil than retroactive rule making by the
courts.
CONCLUSION

AND

SUGGESTIONS

The history of judicial review by the Customs Court and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals unfortunately demonstrates
that they have not functioned effectively or sensibly in the area of foreign trade regulation. They have substituted their judgment for the
judgment of the President in matters that have been committed to the
President's discretion. They have applied the "substantial evidence"
213 19 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)-(b) (1964).
214 See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
215 Id. at 619-23; 1 X. DAvis, supra note 8, at § 5.08.
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rule to proceedings that are not, and were never intended to be, "onthe-record" proceedings. They have issued-in connection with the
exercise of an extrajudicial revisory function (section 337 cases)- pronouncements that have had no legal force. They have erroneously
denominated as "rule making," proceedings that have involved essentially factual determinations of past conduct, the classic definition of
the "adjudicatory" proceeding. They have erroneously construed permissive provisions as constituting mandates. They have disregarded
judicial precedent. And they have done virtually all of this collaterally,
pursuant to procedures that are inappropriate for the type of judicial
review in which they have engaged.
There is no doubt that a number of the statutes whose administration these courts are called upon to review are ineptly drawn and
improperly conceived.2 16 Nonetheless, it is our view that even in the
absence of statutory revision these courts can extricate themselves
from the morass of confusion that has attended their proceedings if
they adhere to the following suggestions:
1. The courts should understand fully the nature of the functions
that have been vested in the President, the Tariff Commission, and
the Secretary of the Treasury. The actions of the President in this
area have been committed to his discretion; the actions of the Commission, except under the Antidumping Act, are wholly advisory; and
the actions of the Secretary of the Treasury are the end product of
adjudication, not rule making, by him and the Commission. Moreover, the proceedings under these statutes are in no sense on-the-record
proceedings.
2. The courts should tailor the scope of their judicial review to
the nature of these actions and proceedings. Accordingly, the exercise
of presidential discretion and the sufficiency of Commission advice
should be excluded from the scope of their review of actions under
section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930, under section 22 of the AAA, and
under the escape-clause provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
Likewise, the "substantial evidence" rule is inappropriate as a standard
for review of the determinations of the Secretary and the Tariff Commission under the Antidumping Act. It is also inappropriate with respect to judicial review of the advice of the Commission and the
determinations of the President under section 336, section 22, and
the escape clause. With respect to these latter statutes, judicial review
216 While there is little question that major changes are called for in, the substantive
provisions that have been considered and in the prevailing statutory procedures for judicial
review, it cannot be the purpose of this article to discuss what these changes should be;
that analysis warrants separate treatment.
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should be limited to a consideration of whether there has been compliance with the statutory mandates involved. So far as the Antidumping Act is concerned, the scope of review should be whether there is
a rational basis in law for the determinations of the Secretary and the
Tariff Commission.
As for section 337, there is little question that the exercise by the
CCPA of the extrajudicial revisory function provided for therein is
incompatible with its status as a constitutional court. The CCPA and
Customs Court should decline to exercise this function even if the
President's discretion is challenged pursuant to the general review
provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930. By failing to follow this course,
they will be inviting reversal by the Supreme Court.
3. If and when the Customs Court and the CCPA determine
that there is non-compliance with the statutory mandates involved in
section 336, section 22, and escape-clause cases, or that there is no rational basis in law for the determinations under the Antidumping
Act, they should remand the matter for, or hold it pending, a proper
disposition by the administrative officials involved, and not substitute
their judgment for that of the officials charged with administration of
the laws. Import restrictions and dumping determinations have been
consigned by the Congress to the President, the Secretary, and the
Commission.
4. The courts should make greater use of the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis. The Supreme Court's rationale for the nonapplication of the principle of res judicata in customs jurisprudence
was addressed to the question of the classification of merchandise, the
question most often presented in litigation before the Customs Court
and CCPA. This rationale has no applicability to the validity of a
presidential proclamation or a dumping finding of the Secretary of the
Treasury. The greater use of these principles in conjunction with the
recent changes in the statutory procedures for judicial review could
result in a more efficient disposition of many cases.
It cannot be expected, in view of the past performance of these
courts, that a major transformation in the judicial process in this area
of foreign trade regulation will occur even if these suggestions are accepted and applied. After all, the relevant body of case law has evolved
over a period of almost fifty years, and the more recent opinions of
these courts are no less confusing than their earlier ones. Nonetheless,
pending a major overhaul of the substantive and procedural provisions
of the statutes, these changes in approach to the judicial review of actions under the trade statutes would be beneficial to the public interest.

